Work and Family Conflict: Indicators, Changes, and Welfare Policy Regimes

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ABSTRACT

Existing literature has inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between work-family conflict and social welfare regimes. It also rarely includes countries beyond western welfare regimes and explores changes in work-family conflict over time. To address the puzzle and gaps, this study uses 2002, 2005, 2012, and 2015 the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to investigate the differences and changes in three indicators of work-family conflict, including time squeeze, energy depletion, and blurred boundary, and their performance in western social welfare regimes, as well as in welfare transitioning areas including southern European, central/east European, Latin American, and Asian countries. The results from multilevel logistic regression reveal that the patterns of time squeeze and energy depletion differ from that of blurred boundary. Western social welfare regimes tend to have a lower level of time squeeze and energy depletion, but exhibit a higher level of blurred boundary, compared to welfare transitioning countries. Additionally, social democratic welfare regime experiences a greater decline in work-family conflict over a decade, as does Latin America, which initially has the highest baseline of work-family conflict. This study demonstrates the dimensions of work and family conflicts, their patterns and changes across different social welfare regimes, offering implications for family policies.

Keywords: work and family; work and family conflicts; social welfare regime; social policy

INTRODUCTION

Work and family are greedy institutes, competing for individuals' time, energy, and concentration. Juggling between work and family demands becomes inevitable life routines in modern society. Prior research has shown that work-family conflict has detrimental impacts on, for example, physical and mental health (Glavin et al. 2011; Hagqvist et al. 2017; Minnotte and Yucel 2018), relationship quality (Kuo et al. 2018; Vahedi et al. 2019), work and life satisfaction (Sirgy and Lee 2018) and

fertility intention (Begall and Mills 2011). Therefore, numerous nations are directing their focus toward this issue. Countries in different social welfare regimes adopt different strategies to balance the role of state, market, and family. Widely discussed welfare regimes are liberal, conservative, and social democratic states. However, results are inconclusive in previous studies. For example, some studies showed that family-friendly measures such as work flexibility or childcare, can effectively mitigate work-family conflict (Byron 2005; Madsen 2003; Strandh and Nordenmark 2006; van der Lippe et al. 2006; Stier et al. 2012); however, other studies had contradictory findings (Steiber 2009; Notten et al. 2017). Moreover, some found that the lowest level of work-family conflict takes place in social democratic sates (Crompton and Lyonette 2006), but others had different conclusions (Edlund 2007; Strandh and Nordenmark 2006). The disparities in research findings may, in part, be attributed to the inconsistent measurement of work-family conflict. Researchers employ a variety of indicators that encompass different dimensions of work-family conflict. At times, the conflict is assessed using a single indicator, impeding meaningful comparisons, while in other instances, it is measured using an aggregate of multiple indicators, probably leading to the cancelation between indicators (e.g., Kaufman and Taniguchi 2019; Nomaguchi 2009; Ruppanner and Maume 2016; Taiji and Mills 2020). To disentangle the puzzle, this study uses International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to investigate different types of work-family conflict, as well as their performance in different social welfare regimes.

Furthermore, studies discussing work-family conflict disproportionately focus on liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes, called welfare forerunners in this study. Nevertheless, other societies, such as southern Europe or Asia, are now encountering similar challenges, calling for reform of social policies. Prior research found that as new technologies and values spread out from proceeding countries to those that lag behind, the laggards would experience a greater change, converging to the forerunners (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Geist and Cohen 2011; Sullivan et al. 2014; Altintas and Sullivan 2017). Unfortunately, few studies include those transitioning societies into discussion. To expand the global picture regarding work-family conflict, this study, in addition to welfare forerunners, incorporates southern Europe, central/east Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The ISSP employed by this study annually collects data across countries, and executes similar research module every ten years. These features help demonstrate the long-term effectiveness of social policies among welfare forerunners, and depict changes in countries that lag behind to determine whether they are moving closer to those that are more advanced.

Therefore, this study asks two research questions: 1) to illustrate patterns of different work-family indicators, and 2) to investigate their performance and changes across different social welfare regimes. This study brings several contributions to existing literature. First, discussing different work-family conflict indicators helps to identify different dimensions of conflicts, further disentangling the puzzle.

Moreover, depicting similarities and differences of work-family conflict indicators across countries helps evaluate policy strategies, and further indicate what the governments should do to facilitate work-family balance. Third, incorporating countries experiencing welfare transitions provides a more comprehensive picture for studies regarding welfare regimes and work-family conflict. It also helps examine whether countries that lag behind in welfare policies undergo significant changes, moving closer to the forerunners, as seen in the patterns of other family behaviors.

BACKGROUND

Work-family conflict and Indicators

Work-family conflict is defined as "a form of interrole conflict in which the role pressures from the work and family domains are mutually incompatible in some respect" (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985, p. 77). Work and family are greedy institutes, competing one's time, energy, and concentration. As people fail to fulfill the role in the family they expect due to work demands, work-to-family conflicts (W → F, hereafter) happens. In contrast, family-to-work conflict (F → W, hereafter) arises when the role in family influences the performance at work. Although few studies combine W → F and F → W when discussing work- family conflicts (Öun 2012; Edlund 2007), most research considers W → F and F → W are two different aspects of work-family conflict. They are considered related but have distinct causes and consequences (e.g., Ferrarini 2006; Frone 2003; Grzywacz et al. 2002; Hill 2005; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Duxbury and Higgins 2001; Hammer et al. 2003). In general, regarding individual-level factors, gender role attitude, life course, and work conditions would impact the level of work-family conflict. For example, factors such as women, parenthood, and traditional gender values, long work hours and job insecurity, increase the likelihood of experiencing work-family conflict (Grzywacz et al. 2002; Dilworth and Kingsbury 2005; Fan et al. 2019; Taiji and Mills 2020).

Regarding country-level factors, family-friendly policies, and equalitarian gender culture would mitigate work-family conflict. Some findings, however, are inconsistent in the existing literature. For example, some research pointed out that flexibility and autonomy can reduce work-family conflict (Moen et al. 2008; Maume and Houston 2001), but other research found they are positively related to work-family conflict (Drobnič and Guillén Rodríguez 2011; Schieman et al. 2009). Although Family-friendly policies are considered an effective strategy to ameliorate work-family conflict (Gornick et al. 1997; Leira 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994), some research found that these policies do not yield the expected results (Notten et al. 2017; Steiber 2009). Some studies argued that social democratic regimes can better sustain work-family balance (Crompton and Lyonette 2006); nevertheless, other studies hold different opinions (Edlund 2007; Strandh and Nordenmark 2006).

Contradictory findings in previous research may be attributed, in part, to inconsistent measurement work-family conflict. Some studies relied on a single indicator (e.g., Ruppanner and Maume 2016; Nomaguchi 2009) while others combined multiple indicators (e.g., Kaufman and

Taniguchi 2019; Taiji and Mills 2020). However, it's important to recognize that different indicators assess various dimensions of work-family conflict, and their responses to environmental and contextual factors may differ (Greenhaus and Beutell 1985). Consequently, a more nuanced examination of these conflict indicators can help clarify the puzzle. This study uses the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a widely recognized dataset for investigating work-family conflict. Three specific indicators are adopted —namely, time squeeze, energy depletion, and blurred boundaries— and measure each in both W → F and F → W.

Time squeeze is indicative of different roles vying for limited time, where the time allocated to one role becomes unavailable for another. For instance, time spent commuting and working cannot be allocated to family care. Concerning work, factors such as long work hours, nonstandard work shifts, or inflexible schedules can readily encroach upon family time (Voydanoff 2005; Clark 2001; Goldin 2021; Presser 2003; Tammelin et al. 2017). Strategies such as paid leave, restrictions on work hours, or the availability of part-time work can help alleviate W → F related to time squeeze.

Energy depletion refers to the idea that the demands and stress associated with one role can impact the performance of another role. For example, caring for a sick family member can deplete one's energy, potentially affecting work performance. Concerning work, job characteristics such as high intensity, pressure, or complexity can deplete the energy that individuals have available for their family responsibilities (Yang et al. 2000; Boyar et al. 2008; Frone 2003). Strategies such as paid leave or a fair evaluation system can help alleviate W → F related to energy depletion.

Blurred boundary illustrates that mutual interference between work and family, often requiring individuals to address both work and family needs simultaneously. For example, working from home often involves balancing job tasks with household chores or childcare responsibilities. Previous studies have shown that part-time employment, flexible work schedules, or remote work arrangements can easily lead to this type of conflict (Allen et al. 2015; Badawy and Schieman 2021; Schieman and Young 2010; Glavin and Schieman 2012), potentially resulting in longer work hours and increased job intensity (Lott 2020; Glass and Noonan 2016; Kelliher and Anderson 2010). Individuals who utilize work flexibility often find themselves working diligently to prove they are not slacking off (Cristea and Leonardi 2019; Williams et al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015). Sometimes, the convenience of flexible work arrangements can also bring additional family demands (Sullivan and Lewis 2001), further intensify the interference of work and family responsibilities.

In the realm of family, factors such as household composition, gender attitudes, division of labor, intensive parenting, or the significance of family time can influence one's roles at work, impacting their time, energy, and boundaries (Hays 1996; Nomaguchi 2009; Kaufman and Taniguchi 2019). Additionally, the availability of care services and cash assistance benefits, along with after-school programs, can help alleviate F → W.

Taken together, while these indicators are interrelated, they represent distinct dimensions of work-family conflict. Their causes, consequences, and the policies needed to address these conflicts differ. Therefore, this study initially investigates the three indicators across countries over a decade to comprehend their variations and changes.

Work-family conflict and Social Welfare Regimes

Social welfare regimes serve as a comprehensive means to depict a country's structural characteristics, encompassing its policy context, cultural norms, gender relations, labor market dynamics, historical traditions, and the intricate interplay between the state, market, and family. Prior studies have demonstrated the explanatory power of social welfare regimes in elucidating variations in work and family domains across countries (Altintas and Sullivan 2017; Esping-Andersen 2009; Gauthier 1996; Geist 2005; Goodin et al. 2003; Kamerman and Moss 2009; O' Brien 2009; Kan et al. 2022). This study focuses on widely discussed Western social welfare regimes, which are referred to as "welfare forerunners" in this context, including liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Grönlund and Öun 2010; Korpi 2000). Additionally, this research incorporates "welfare laggards," such as Southern Europe, Central/East Europe (post-communist), Latin America, and Asia, which are currently undergoing transitions in their welfare systems. Although previous studies used different perspectives to identify clusters, their country classifications remain largely similar (Esping-Andersen 1990; Grönlund and Öun 2010; Korpi 2000). The welfare laggards in this study are grouped based on regional, cultural, and historical considerations.

Liberal regime: market-oriented models

Countries in the liberal regime are characterized by liberal politics, capitalist economics, and residualist social policies, primarily featuring means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or limited social insurance plans (Goodin et al. 2003). They tend to favor market-led solutions over state intervention. With a largely deregulated labor market and limited public provision of services, the government's role in facilitating the balance between work and household demands is minimal. Despite female employment rates exceeding the OECD average, these countries often adhere to the male-breadwinner model, where women are expected to bear the primary responsibility for domestic work despite their significant participation in the labor market (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lewis 1992; Kan et al. 2022). Examples of countries representative of the liberal model include the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

Conservative regime: traditional models

The state plays a subsidiary role in the provision of social services and welfare in the conservative regime. Social services are primarily delivered through social insurance programs, jointly supported by the state and employers. Benefits are oriented towards families rather than individuals. Consequently, this status-segmented and family-centered welfare provision reinforces occupational differentiation and upholds the traditional male breadwinner/female homemaker model (Korpi 2000). While there are typically generous parental leave policies, there are relatively few interventionist programs aimed at facilitating the combination of work and household demands (Esser and Ferrarini

2010; Morgan and Zippel 2003; Montanari 2000). Notably, part-time job opportunities, which offer similar employment protection and many of the same social rights as full-time positions, have primarily been directed towards married women and mothers (Esping-Andersen 1990; Jaeger 2002), somewhat mitigating traditional gendered effects. Representative countries for the conservative model include Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Social democratic regime: dual-earner models

The state plays a crucial role in providing services and benefits to its citizens (Orloff 1993). The extensive use of family-friendly policies, such as paid parental leave and high-quality public childcare, aims to facilitate the successful combination of work with household responsibilities for both men and women. Generous and universal welfare benefits contribute to high employment rates among both women and men, promoting gender equality and a dual-earner model of the family (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Korpi 2000). Countries like Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are typically classified as belonging to the social democratic regime.

Southern Europe

While the Southern European regime shares some similarities with the conservative regime, it is often viewed as transitional, characterized by a blend of public and non-public institutions in welfare provision, generally lower efficiency of state services, and relatively underdeveloped social security systems (Ferrera 1996). Social policies are built upon traditional family relations, with childcare and eldercare relying on informal support from family networks. As a result, women's participation in the labor market is limited, and childcare is largely perceived as the responsibility of mothers or other family members. Countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal are representative of the Southern regime.

Central/East Europe (post-communist)

Before the introduction of capitalist democracy, these countries had relatively well-developed family policy transfers and services to encourage women to stay in paid work, driven more by economic necessity rather than ideological considerations (Van der Lippe et al. 2006; Rostgaard 2004). However, since the 1990s, the transition towards capitalism led to a rapid rise in unemployment and a significant drop in real incomes. The state shifted its focus towards economic restructuring rather than facilitating the integration of work and private life (Van der Lippe et al. 2006). While some aspects of the communist legacy, such as childcare facilities and maternity leave, are still in place (as shown in Appendix 1), there has been an increased emphasis on traditional family support (Esser and Ferrarini 2010). Men typically hold full-time jobs with inflexible and standard working hours, with minimal involvement in household tasks. Conversely, women participate in paid work while simultaneously taking on family responsibilities (Van der Lippe 2001; Wallace 2002). Countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia are considered part of this welfare regime

Latin America

Latin America is often classified as an informal welfare regime, characterized by the practical absence of states, with most of the population relying on family or community ties for support (Gough and Wood 2004). Labor markets frequently exclude the majority of the population, resulting in many people working in the informal sector. Consequently, the primary source of protection is stratified systems of social security linked to occupations, primarily benefiting formal workers. Informal workers depend on their income and family strategies to address risks such as disease and old age (Barrientos 2004). In recent decades, as collectively shared risks have diminished and public policies have scaled back, individuals find themselves increasingly self-reliant. Scholars argue that Latin America has shifted towards a "liberal-informal" welfare regime, resembling the liberal regime but lacking robust targeted state programs (Barrientos 2004)

Asia

Welfare policies in this region are underdeveloped, resembling the non-interventionist liberal model (Choi 2012). These countries prioritize economic development over social policies and have constrained the expansion and generosity of welfare systems (Choi 2012; Gough 2001; Holliday 2000; Lee and Ku 2007; Jacobs 1998). Consequently, states allocate relatively higher investments in health and education while providing comparatively less support in areas such as childcare and unemployment benefits. Additionally, these countries are characterized by strong family ties and traditional gender ideologies, with men expected to be the primary breadwinners supporting dependents in their households and extended families, while women shoulder family obligations. Although there has been a gradual increase in the provision of welfare for care and family support, public social expenditure remains relatively low compared to Western countries (Estévez-Abe and Naldini 2016; Gauthier 2016; Sung and Pascall 2014). For instance, social expenditure constituted about 10.9% of GDP in 2013 for Taiwan and 1.5% in 2012 for the Philippines (as shown in Appendix 1)

Trends and Changes

For welfare forerunners, some studies have found that the liberal regime exhibits higher levels of work-family conflict, the social democratic regime falls in the middle, and the conservative regime has the lowest level (Bahr et al. 1983; Scanzoni and Fox 1980; Edlund 2007). The social democratic model, surprisingly, may not be the best at sustaining work-family balance. This could be because people take on multiple roles within the dual-earner model, increasing the likelihood of encountering work-family conflict due to limited time and energy. Conversely, the traditional model, based on conventional gender divisions of labor, encourages individuals to focus on one primary role,

potentially reducing conflicts between work and family (Boye 2008; Bratberg et al. 2002; Strandh and Nordenmark 2006).

However, other studies have found that the dual-earner model can effectively maintain a low level of work-family conflict (Grönlund and Öun 2010), supporting the argument of role expansion. This perspective contends that resources associated with one role can support another role and alleviate tension and fatigue through role switching (Ferrarini 2006; Grönlund and Öun 2010). Nevertheless, these studies primarily used one-time-point data. Using multiple-time-point data to investigate changes in different indicators of work-family conflict helps clarify which welfare regime can effectively mitigate specific aspects of work-family conflict and disentangle the inconsistent findings. Notably, social policies among welfare forerunners have become more divergent rather than convergent in recent years (Gauthier 2002; Sainsbury 1999).

Additionally, welfare transitioning regimes, including southern Europe, central/east Europe, Latin America, and Asia, may experience higher levels of work-family conflict. However, they might also undergo more significant changes than their preceding counterparts. Many studies have found that although preceding countries often exhibit a higher level of innovation and advancement, they are less responsive to change. Conversely, countries that lag behind tend to adapt more rapidly, converging with their preceding counterparts once the diffusion process begins (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Geist and Cohen 2011; Sullivan et al. 2014; Altintas and Sullivan 2017). For example, countries with more traditional gender ideologies and divisions of labor tend to experience a more pronounced shift toward egalitarianism (Geist and Cohen 2011; Altintas and Sullivan 2017).

In summary, welfare contexts can significantly influence whether and how people can balance work and family life. Therefore, the second research question of this study aims to investigate the relationship between social welfare regimes and patterns/changes in work-family conflict.

DATA AND METHOD

Data

To address the research questions, this study creates a dataset that combines individual-level data with country-level measures. The individual-level data are sourced from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a cross-national collaborative programme that conducts annual surveys on various topics relevant to the social sciences. Questions related to work and family conflicts were included in the Module of Family and Changing Gender Roles in 2002 and 2012, as well as the Module of Work Orientation in 2005 and 2015.

To examine the changes over a decade, 28 nations[1] that participated in both 2002 and 2012 surveys are selected, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Czech, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Please note that because six countries are not available in 2005 and 2015 surveys (including Austria, Chile, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia), there are 22 nations in the 2005/2015 analytical models. A robustness check that excludes these six countries for 2002/2012 analytical models yields similar conclusions to those presented here (available upon request).

The country-level measures, in addition to the type of welfare states, include the average work hours, the female labor force participation rate, and equalitarian gender attitudes. These measures are aligned with the survey years, except for equalitarian gender attitudes (further details can be found in the measurement section). The country-level information is obtained from the International Labour Organization, Human Development Reports, and official statistics published by the respective governments.

Sample

The sample for this study comprises individuals aged 18-55 who are employed, as they are more likely to experience the challenges of balancing work and family responsibilities. After excluding individuals with missing values for gender and work-family conflict (1502 cases for 2002/2012 and 859 cases for 2005/2015), the sample sizes are 34,754 and 27,545 for the 2002/2012 and 2005/2015 surveys, respectively. However, in both cases, approximately 6.46% (2002/2012) and 6.51% (2005/2015) of the sample have missing values in independent variables. Multiple imputation (MI) is conducted to address missing cases in analyses. Note that models without MI yield similar results (details available upon request).

Measurement

Dependent variable

Three indicators are used to represent work-family conflict: time squeeze, energy depletion, and blurred boundaries, each comprising two dimensions — "work → family" and "family → work" conflicts. The first two indicators are derived from a group of questions in 2002/2012 Module, asking "How often has each of the following happened to you during the past three months?" *Time squeeze* is generated from paired situations, namely, "It has been difficult for me to fulfil my family responsibilities because of the amount of time I spent on my job" (referring to "work → family"), and "I have found it difficult to concentrate at work because of my family responsibilities" (referring

[1] Although Bulgaria and Ireland were surveyed in 2002 and 2012, they are not included in the analyses due to the lack of information on household children.

to "family → work" conflicts). *Energy depletion* is created from two paired situations: "I have come home from work too tired to do the chores which need to be done" (referring to "work → family"), and "I have arrived at work too tired to function well because of the household work I had done" (referring to "family → work"). Responses to these questions include "several times a week", "several times a month", "once or twice", and "never". Those who choose "several times a week "and "several times a month" are coded as 1 (Yes), while others are coded as 0 (No). *Blurred boundary* is constructed from two paired questions in 2005/2015 Module, "How often do you feel that the demands of your job interfere with your family life?" and "How often do you feel that the demands of your family life interfere with your job?" Response categories are: "always", "often", "sometimes", "hardly ever", and "never". Those who choose "always", "often", or "sometimes" are coded as 1 (Yes), while others are coded as 0 (No). A robust check, which employed more conservative indicators by considering only "several times a week" in 2002/2012 and "always" and "often" in 2005/2015 as "Yes" did not alter the conclusions (details available upon request).

Independent variables

Analytical models include individual-level and country-level independent variables. The individual-level covariates include gender, parenthood, partnership status, age, education, employment status, occupation, family income quintile, other adults, survey year.

Gender consists of men (coded as 0) and women (coded as 1).

Parenthood refers to individuals who have household children under age 18. Note that the ISSP data have no information about the relationship between the respondent and household children.

Partnership status includes no partner (coded as 0), and partnered (coded as 1). Due to limited information in some countries, this variable cannot distinguish between married and cohabiting individuals. Additionally, a robustness check that incorporates partner's employment status, coded as no partner, partnered – partner having full-time work, partnered – partner having part-time work, and partnered – partner not working, yields similar results. Models, therefore, stay with the parsimonious one.

Age. Because Denmark only provides age ranges in 2015, the variable is constructed as age18-25, age 26-35, age 36-45, and age 46-55.

Education is coded as 0 for no college degree and 1 for college degree.

Employment status consists of full-time (coded as 0) and part-time (coded as 1).

Occupation is coded as 0 for not professional/managerial and 1 for professional/managerial.

Family income quintile is split into five categories within each country, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). This variable indicates the respondent's relative position in terms of family income within their respective countries.

Other adults refers to whether there are other adults living in the household. Similar to parenthood, the ISSP data do not provide specific information about the relationship between the respondent and other household members.

Survey year is coded as 0 for 2002/2005, and 1 for 2012/2015.

Country-level variables include social welfare regime, average work hours, female labor force participation rate, and equalitarian gender attitudes. All variables use 2002, 2012, 2005, and 2015 information, except for equalitarian gender attitudes. See more details in the country profile in the Appendix 1.

Social welfare regime is comprised of liberal (Australia, UK, US), conservative (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland), social democratic (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), southern Europe (Portugal, Spain), central/east Europe (post-communist countries: Czech, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia), Latin America (Chile, Mexico), and Asia (Israel, Japan, Philippines, Taiwan). In this study, traditional western welfare states, including the liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes, are referred to as "welfare forerunners". Those undergoing welfare transitioning are referred to as "welfare laggards", including southern Europe, central/east Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Due to a greater diversity of Asian countries, robustness checks are conducted by sequentially excluding non-East Asian countries (Israel and the Philippines), and these checks yield similar conclusions.

Average work hours refers to a country's average weekly hours actually worked per employed person, obtained from the International Labour Organization and the annual reports of national statistics.

Female labor force participation rate indicates the proportion of female aged 15 and above that actively engage in the labor market. The information is obtained from the Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme and the annual reports of national statistics.

Equalitarian gender attitudes is an average score of each country derived from four indicators related to gender role attitudes in the 2002 and 2012 ISSP surveys (Cronbach's alpha is 0.72 in 2002 and 0.82 in 2012). Those questions are (1) "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.", (2) "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.", (3) "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.", and (4) "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family." Assigning 1-5 points to response categories from strongly agree to strongly disagree, and reversing

the coding of indicator (1), every respondent gets a score by summing up the four indictors. An average score is generated to represent equalitarian gender attitudes for each country, with the higher score referring to more equalitarian gender attitudes. Since 2005/2015 ISSP module did not ask the same questions, 2002/2012 scores are applied to 2005/2015 by assuming that the country-level gender attitudes rarely have a change in a three-year window.

Table 1 shows all individual-level and country-level variables.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables

Individual-level (weighted)	2002	2012	2005	2015
Time squeeze: W → F (%)				
No	66.99	65.84		
Yes	33.01	34.16		
Time squeeze: F → W (%)				
No	89.52	88.21		
Yes	10.48	11.79		
Energy depletion: W → F (%)				
No	49.31	50.49		
Yes	50.69	49.51		
Energy depletion: F → W (%)				
No	89.25	88.59		
Yes	10.75	11.41		
Blurred boundary: W → F (%)				
No			47.49	51.44
Yes			52.51	48.56
Blurred boundary: F → W (%)				
No			72.93	71.07
Yes			27.07	28.93
Gender (%)				
Men	52.37	51.59	52.64	51.27
Women	47.63	48.41	47.36	48.73
Parenthood (%)				
No	44.65	47.70	45.91	47.64
Yes	53.34	51.08	51.62	49.33
Missing	2.01	1.22	2.47	3.02
Education (%)				
Non-college	80.53	64.99	78.66	60.35
College	18.91	34.53	20.63	39.46
Missing	0.55	0.48	0.71	0.19
Partnership (%)				
No	27.46	27.82	28.55	28.27
Yes	72.43	72.09	71.34	71.62
Missing	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11

Employment status (%)				
Full-time	83.81	88.38	83.77	87.13
Part-time	16.19	11.62	16.23	12.87
Occupation (%)				
Non-professional/managerial	73.11	72.42	73.07	68.84
Professional/managerial	22.11	23.50	22.90	28.14
Missing	4.78	4.08	4.03	3.02
Family income quintile (%)				
1st	10.74	8.65	8.70	8.58
2nd	13.60	13.48	14.77	13.16
3rd	18.39	15.98	19.35	17.66
4th	22.53	21.24	20.20	20.59
5th	19.71	17.95	20.14	20.01
Missing	15.05	22.69	16.83	20.01
Age group (%)				
18-25	12.50	11.54	12.34	12.12
26-35	28.66	27.47	27.28	27.01
36-45	32.45	31.52	31.25	30.47
46-55	26.38	29.46	29.12	30.41
Other Adults (%)				
No	57.56	60.72	61.09	59.26
Yes	35.67	37.42	36.37	37.07
Missing	6.78	1.86	2.53	3.67
N (individuals)	17,861	16,893	14,099	13,446
Country-level	2002	2012	2005	2015
Social welfare regimes (%)				
Liberal	10.71	10.71	13.64	13.64
Conservative	21.43	21.43	18.18	18.18
Social democratic	14.29	14.29	18.18	18.18
Southern Europe	7.14	7.14	4.55	4.55
Central/East Europe	25.00	25.00	22.73	22.73
Latin America	7.14	7.14	4.55	4.55
Asia	14.29	14.29	18.18	18.18
Average weekly work hours	38.43	37.00	38.35	36.91
	(3.06)	(2.70)	(3.12)	(2.50)
Female labor force participation rate	51.09	53.42	52.39	54.02
	(6.65)	(4.95)	(5.78)	(5.05)
Equalitarian gender attitudes	12.71	13.63	12.97	13.91
	(1.38)	(2.03)	(1.37)	(2.17)
N (countries)	28	28	22	22

Note. Table 1 presents the distributions before MI so the % missing values is included. MI is applied in the analytical models.

RESULTS

Patterns and Changes of the Work-Family Conflict Indicators

Figure 1 illustrates the patterns and changes in time squeeze, energy depletion, and blurred boundary across countries. First of all, the percentage of blurred boundary is the highest, followed by energy depletion and then time squeeze. Notably, the pattern is more pronounced in F → W. Moreover, W → F is much more prevalent than F → W. That suggests that work remains the dominant domain in life that consuming people's time and energy, and leading frequent work-family mutual interference.

Interestingly, in general welfare laggards tend to have a higher proportion of time squeeze and energy depletion, while welfare forerunners exhibit greater conflict in blurred boundary. For a comprehensive overview of each country's ranking in work-family conflict across the three indicators, please refer to Appendix 3, which provides insights into the overall patterns and variations in the social welfare regime.

Furthermore, countries experiencing an increase in W → F are primarily found in liberal regime, conservative regime, and Asia. This could be associated with the ability of their social policies to adapt to changing work conditions. On the other hand, although F → W is generally low, over 70% of countries have seen an increase in F → W over the past decade. This could be attributed to changes in family and population composition, as well as evolving values related to family and parenting. For more detailed information, please consult Appendix 4, which presents the number of countries experiencing growth in work and family conflicts categorized by social welfare regime.

Social Welfare Regime and Work-family conflict

To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between social welfare regime and work-family conflict, Table 2 presents the results of multilevel logistic regression, controlling for individual-level and country-level covariates.

Model 1 shows the results of *time squeeze*. In 2002, compared to the liberal regime, social democratic countries have lower level of W → F, which suggests that dual-earner models can effectively reduce the influence of time demand at work on family life. The performance of W → F in the conservative regime, southern Europe, and Asia is similar to that of the liberal regime. This similarity might be attributed to these countries predominantly relying on the family to address the conflicting demands arising from work, which aligns with market-oriented models and leads to comparable results. Conversely, central/east Europe and Latin America exhibit higher level of W → F. In the post-communist era, central/east Europe shifted its focus towards economic development and reduced the provision of welfare infrastructure. Latin America, characterized by underdeveloped welfare policies and a disproportionate informal sector, also lacked significant investment in social policies, which

could account for the higher levels of W → F in these regions. In addition, W → F in time squeeze rarely changes over a decade, except for social democratic and Latin American countries, that experience a decline.

Model 1 also provides results of F → W in time squeeze. In 2002, compared with the liberal regime, conservative and social democratic countries exhibit lower F → W. This outcome may be attributed to their higher proportion of public child care, helping ameliorate the impact of family need on work. In contrast, F → W is relatively high in Southern Europe and Latin America, owing to stronger family ties and insufficient social services to meet family needs. Central/east Europe that have remnant welfare infrastructure from in the communist era for encouraging women's participation in production, and Asia have similar level of F → W with liberal regime. Interestingly, over a decade, welfare forerunners experience a more pronounced increase in F → W, whereas welfare laggards display a smaller increase or even a decline, which may be related to a growing emphasis on valuing family time and adopting intensive parenting among these forerunners.

Model 2 presents the results of energy depletion, and the pattern closely mirrors that observed for time squeeze. In 2002, social democratic countries still have the lowest levels of W → F. The performance of W → F in the conservative regime, southern Europe, Asia, and Latin America was similar to that in liberal regimes. Central/east Europe have the highest record. Over a decade, social democratic, southern European, and Central/east European countries experience a decline.



Figure 1. Patterns and Changes of Work-Family Conflict Indicators across Countries

Additionally, regarding F → W in energy depletion, social democratic countries have the lowest level, while southern Europe, central/east Europe, and Latin America have a higher level in F → W. In the middle are the conservative regime and Asia, showing similarities with the liberal regime. F → W displays an increase over a decade, except for a decline in Latin America.

Lastly, the results of blurred boundary are shown in Model 3. Notably, the pattern of blurred boundary differs from the previous two indicators. In 2005, welfare forerunners have a higher level of W → F, similar to Latin America. However, W → F in blurred boundary is lower in southern European, central/east European, and Asian countries. The inverse pattern compared to the previous indicators may be due to the fact that welfare forerunners encourage work flexibility, while Latin America have a higher proportion of informal sector, which likely allows for more flexible work arrangement. Between 2005 and 2015, the level of W → F in blurred boundary remain relatively stable, expect for social democratic and central/east European countries, which experience a decline. Additionally, in 2005, only central/east European countries has a lower level of F → W in blurred boundary relative to the liberal regime. This pattern persisted over a decade, except for Latin America, which experienced a decline in F → W in blurred boundary.

Table 2. Multilevel logit models: Social welfare regime and work-family conflict

	1		2		3	
	Time squeeze		Energy depletion		Blurred boundaries	
	W → F	F→ W	W → F	F→ W	W → F	F→ W
Intercept	-1.207	-1.494	0.258	-0.845	4.117+	0.727
	(2.041)	(1.483)	(2.184)	(1.578)	(1.982)	(2.541)
Country-level: Social welfare regimes (rf. Liberal)						
Conservative	-0.098	-0.693**	-0.410+	-0.417	-0.193	-0.020
	(0.187)	(0.207)	(0.203)	(0.295)	(0.187)	(0.193)
Social democratic	-0.222*	-0.790**	-0.357*	-1.202**	-0.163	-0.258
	(0.091)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.287)	(0.195)	(0.238)
Southern Europe	0.235	0.744**	0.253	0.788*	-0.835**	-0.051
	(0.142)	(0.208)	(0.176)	(0.292)	(0.179)	(0.166)
Central/East Europe	0.669**	0.193	0.430*	0.705*	-0.555*	-0.956**
	(0.159)	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.303)	(0.230)	(0.198)
Latin America	1.048**	1.869**	0.643+	2.045**	-0.375	0.381
	(0.300)	(0.286)	(0.370)	(0.309)	(0.393)	(0.536)
Asia	0.292+	0.267	-0.101	0.700	-0.669*	-0.088
	(0.171)	(0.498)	(0.280)	(0.436)	(0.314)	(0.399)
Survey years 2012/15 (rf. 2002/05)	0.031	0.324**	0.099	0.248**	-0.073	0.207
	(0.071)	(0.021)	(0.108)	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.121)
Country-level: Social welfare regimes (rf. Liberal)						
Conservative	0.087	0.056	-0.091	0.003	-0.224	-0.311
	(0.165)	(0.132)	(0.168)	(0.170)	(0.143)	(0.212)

Social democratic	-0.203*	0.130	-0.320*	0.330	-0.366**	0.021
	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.136)	(0.210)	(0.097)	(0.163)
Southern Europe	-0.003	-0.520*	-0.601**	0.022	0.290	0.351
	(0.264)	(0.191)	(0.209)	(0.143)	(0.297)	(0.484)
Central/East Europe	-0.109	-0.176*	-0.440*	-0.157	-0.405*	-0.028
	(0.162)	(0.081)	(0.184)	(0.139)	(0.175)	(0.164)
Latin America	-0.286*	-0.809**	-0.397+	-0.563**	-0.268	-0.513*
	(0.129)	(0.141)	(0.193)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.244)
Asia	-0.004	-0.223+	-0.195	-0.215	-0.045	-0.177
	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.191)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.225)
Country-level variance	0.061**	0.145**	0.095**	0.192**	0.042**	0.062*
	(0.018)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.014)	(0.025)
N	34,754		34,754		27,545	

Note. Models control for individual-level variables including gender, parenthood, education, partnership, employment status, occupation, family income quintile, age, and other adults. Country-level covariates are also incorporated in models such as average weekly work hours, female labor force participation rate, and equalitarian gender attitudes. $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

To provide a concise summary of the findings from the analyses, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the marginal effects of the results presented in Table 2. Figure 2 focuses on W → F, and indicates that the patterns for *time squeeze* and *energy depletion* are quite similar with, although the level of *time squeeze* is lower. In general, welfare forerunners have lower W → F compared to welfare laggards. Among the forerunners, social democratic countries show the lowest level, followed by the conservative regime, and then the liberal regime. Among welfare laggards, Latin America and central/east Europe experience higher W → F in *time squeeze* and *energy depletion*, while the performance of southern Europe and Asia is close to the liberal regime. Interestingly, social democratic countries, central/east Europe, and Latin America experience a decline in W → F over a decade, suggesting that dual-earner models may effectively reduce W → F in *time squeeze* and *energy depletion*. Additionally, laggards experience a greater reduction, converging toward welfare forerunners.

However, the results for W → F in *blurred boundary* exhibit a different pattern compared to the previous indicators. Generally, W → F in *blurred boundary* is higher in welfare forerunners than in welfare laggards, except for Latin America. Over a decade, among the forerunners, the liberal regime still maintains the highest level, while the level declines in social democratic and conservative regimes. Among the laggards, central/east Europe and Latin America experience a greater decline. Overall, the difference in W → F in *blurred boundary* becomes smaller between welfare forerunners and laggards, primarily due to a decrease in the forerunners' levels.

Figure 3 illustrates that the patterns for F → W in *time squeeze* and *energy depletion* are similar. Welfare forerunners consistently exhibit lower levels of these conflicts compared to the laggards.

Among the forerunners, the social democratic regime has the lowest probability of experiencing these types of conflicts, followed by the conservative and liberal regimes in that order. Among the laggards,



Figure 2. Marginal Effects of W → F



Figure 3. Marginal Effects of F → W

Latin America has the highest level of these conflicts and also experiences a greater decline over a decade. However, when it comes to F → W in *blurred boundary*, there is no significant difference across social welfare regimes, except for central/east Europe, which shows a lower level of this conflict. Furthermore, this pattern remains consistent over the decade.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Work-family conflict become a world-wide challenge. Various welfare nations adopt distinct strategies to tackle this issue (Gauthier 2002). Liberal welfare regimes lean towards market-led solutions, conservative nations reply on status segmented and family-centered welfare provision, while social democratic countries adopt dual-earner models (Esping-Andersson 1990; Grönlund and Öun 2010; Korpi 2000). However, previous research has yielded inconsistent conclusions when examining the relationship between different welfare systems and the level of work-family conflict. One possible reason for this inconsistency may be the varying indicators used to measure work-family conflict. Furthermore, past studies on work-family conflict have rarely included countries undergoing transitions in family policies, limiting our understanding of the performance of emerging welfare states. There has also been a lack of research that examines changes of work-family conflict, and investigates the effectiveness of policies strategies adopted by different welfare nations in alleviating work-family conflict. Therefore, this study uses data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys conducted in 2002, 2005, 2012, and 2015 to examine patterns and changes in various work-family conflict indicators. Additionally, it investigates the performance of welfare-advanced and welfare-emerging countries concerning work-family conflict. The results show that the level of work-family conflict is highest in blurred boundary, followed by energy depletion, and lastly time squeeze. The majority of conflicts arise from W → F; however, F → W has been gradually increasing over time. Interestingly, welfare forerunners and welfare laggards have encounter different types of work-family conflict. The former ones exhibit a lower level of time squeeze and energy depletion compared to the latter ones while have a higher level of blurred boundary.

To further clarify the relationship between policy strategies of welfare nations and work-family conflict, multilevel logistic models are conducted, controlling for individual and country-level covariates. The results demonstrate that concerning time squeeze and energy depletion, welfare forerunners, on the whole, exhibit a lower level of such conflicts compared to welfare-transitioning countries. Among these welfare proceeding nations, the liberal regime that replies on market solutions display the highest level of conflicts, while social democratic countries that promote dual-earner models have the lowest level. Conservative states that align with traditional gender division of labor fall in between. Speaking of welfare laggards, Latin America with underdeveloped welfare policies and a significant portion of informal sector report the highest level of such conflicts. Central/east Europe is at the intermediate level. Southern European and Asian countries perform similarly to liberal states. While examining changes in these two types of conflicts over a decade, social

democratic countries and Latin America display a steady decline. As for blurred boundary, welfare forerunners experience a higher level of W → F conflicts than welfare-lagging countries. Moreover, as investigating its changes, conservative and social democratic nations, as well as Latin American and central/east countries exhibit a significant decline.

As a result, in response to the inconsistent findings in the previous research, this study shows using different indicators of work-family conflict indeed yields different conclusions. Welfare-proceeding countries that have long focused on family policies, such as parental leave, public childcare or education subsidies, effectively alleviate conflicts related to time squeeze and energy depletion. Conversely, welfare-transitioning countries tend to experience a higher degree of such conflicts. The outcomes of these two types of indicators probably meet our intuition. However, intriguingly, welfare forerunners report a higher level of conflict in terms of blurred boundary. This might be attributed to the availability of work flexibility, as well as their emphasis on family time. In contrast, welfare-lagging countries may have stricter work regulations, potentially preventing mutual interference of work and family. Consequently, adopting blurred boundaries to measure work-family conflict may draw different conclusions from those employing the former two indicators.

Furthermore, except for blurred boundary where the pattern is less clear, overall welfare-transitioning states tend to experience a higher level of work-family conflict while also exhibiting a greater decline, converging towards welfare-proceeding countries. This mirrors findings in prior literature that focused on other family behaviors (Lesthaeghe 2010; Geist and Cohen 2011; Altintas and Sullivan 2017). The performance of work-family conflict in welfare-lagging countries currently aligns more closely with that of liberal states. Additionally, this study suggests that dual-earner models adopted by social democratic nations lead to a lower work-family conflict and a substantial decrease over time. Governments can draw valuable insights from family policies developed by dual-earner models, such as implementing paid family leave, restricting working hours, and investing in public childcare (Gornick and Meyers 2003).

It goes without saying that this study has some limitations. First, ISSP provides a limited number of countries, resulting in some welfare regimes having fewer countries for analysis. This limitation affects representativeness and contributes to larger variance in model estimates. Future research could explore the possibility of merging databases to expand the number of countries included in the analysis.

Second, potential sample selection bias may lead to conservative estimates, potentially underestimating the relationship. The selection bias could come from that those experiencing high work-family conflict may withdraw from work to reduce conflicts. Appendix 5 presents a comparison between the analytical sample (employed) and the excluded sample (not employed) in terms of basic demographic variables. It is evident that individuals excluded from analyses are more likely to be women, young, low-educated, low income, no partners, and living with others. It is difficult to identify whether those who are not employed are due to work-family conflict or other reasons, like

job availability. Future research with longitudinal survey data can further investigate the issue of selection bias.

Third, while the cluster of welfare states can reflect structural and contextual characteristics, countries within each welfare regime still have variations in welfare policies. Future research can explore the relationship between specific welfare policies and work-family conflict, thereby offering more concrete insights for policymakers.

Despite these limitations, this study analyzes various indicators of work-family conflict and explores their changes, helping disentangle the content of work-family conflict, and providing insights for future policies aim to address challenges related to time squeeze, energy depletion, and blurred boundary. Additionally, incorporating countries beyond the traditional Western welfare regimes broadens the global picture of work-family conflict. This study also shows that social democratic regime is a relatively effective model for alleviating work-family conflict, providing valuable insights for future development in work-family policies.

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Appendix 1. Social Expenditure, in % GDP

Country	2000	2001 [a]	2002	2003 [a]	2010	2011 [a]	2012	2013 [a]
Liberal								
US	—	23.3	—	25.2	—	29.0	—	28.7
UK	—	21.8	—	22.5	—	26.4	—	25.7
Australia	—	20.4	—	19.9	—	20.9	—	21.9
Conservative								
Belgium	—	21.9	—	23.2	—	25.6	—	25.6
France	—	27.4	—	28.5	—	30.7	—	31.3
Netherlands	—	21.9	—	23.3	—	25.9	—	25.9
Austria	—	22.4	—	23.2	—	24.1	—	24.7
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	21.7	—	22.6
Germany	—	25.9	—	27.0	—	24.6	—	24.8
Social Democratic								
Denmark	—	20.9	—	22.2	—	26.4	—	26.8
Finland	—	18.3	—	19.5	—	22.6	—	24.4
Norway	—	18.2	—	20.6	—	19.2	—	19.6
Sweden	—	22.7	—	23.6	—	23.2	—	24.9
Southern Europe								
Spain	—	16.7	—	17.9	—	24.3	—	24.0
Portugal	18.9 [b]	—	—	21.1	—	23.9	—	24.1
Central/East Europe								
Hungary	20.7 [b]	—	—	—	—	20.5	—	19.4
Latvia	15.7 [b]	—	—	—	—	15.1	—	13.7
Poland	20.5 [b]	—	—	—	—	16.6	—	17.5
Russia	10.1 [b]	—	—	—	17.8 [b]	—	—	—
Czech	—	16.5	—	17.4	—	18.1	—	19.0
Slovakia	—	16.6	—	16.5	—	16.8	—	17.3
Slovenia	21.8 [b]	—	—	—	—	21.3	—	21.6
Latin America								
Chile	12.8 [b]	—	—	—	—	12.1	—	12.4
Mexico	—	5.9	—	6.7	—	7.3	—	7.7
Asia								
Japan	—	18.9	—	18.9	—	24.3	—	24.0
Israel	17.2 [b]	—	—	—	—	15.7	—	16.1
Taiwan	8.1 [c]	9.2 [c]	9.4 [c]	9.2 [c]	9.2 [c]	9.5 [c]	10.7 [c]	10.9 [c]
Philippines	1.1 [b]	—	—	—	1.2 [b]	—	1.5 [b]	—

Note. 1. The sources are [a] OECD (2023), [b] ILO (2012), and Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan (2023). 2. OECD reports net total social expenditure, in % GDP; ILO reports total social Expenditure, in % GDP.

Appendix 2. A Country Profile for Country-Level Variables

	Female labor force participation rate [a]				Average weekly work hours [b]				Equalitarian gender attitudes [c]	
Country	2002	2005	2012	2015	2002	2005	2012	2015	2002	2012
Liberal										
US	58.71	58.33	56.78	55.81	36.75	36.89	36.39	36.59	13.99	13.67
UK	54.65	55.39	56.40	57.20	36.19	36.09	35.71	35.94	13.34	14.08
Australia	55.19	56.93	58.72	59.08	34.90	34.67	33.96	33.58	13.11	13.89
Conservative										
Belgium	42.56	45.67	47.10	48.01	36.85	36.96	36.97	37.30	12.68	14.12
France	49.08	50.46	51.54	51.59	37.90	36.47	36.43	35.72	14.04	14.88
Netherlands	55.91	—	59.28	—	31.05	—	32.04	—	13.30	13.92
Austria	50.59	—	54.99	—	36.17	—	31.82	—	12.02	12.35
Switzerland	59.30	59.34	60.83	62.28	35.39	35.86	34.97	34.50	12.40	13.30
Germany	49.38	51.12	54.02	54.72	37.60	37.07	35.78	35.46	13.81	15.04
Social Democratic										
Denmark	60.23	60.39	58.14	56.73	35.65	35.78	35.49	35.14	15.59	16.85
Finland	56.86	56.75	55.97	55.60	37.26	37.43	36.47	36.08	14.00	15.78
Norway	62.35	60.71	61.60	62.29	35.57	35.03	34.64	34.33	14.38	15.42
Sweden	58.59	58.82	59.72	60.69	35.37	36.17	36.05	35.78	15.05	16.04
Southern Europe										
Spain	42.11	46.50	53.44	53.13	38.71	38.99	37.46	37.29	12.67	19.73
Portugal	54.05	—	54.70	—	39.09	—	38.32	—	11.38	12.96
Central/East Europe										
Hungary	41.37	43.05	44.97	47.37	40.15	38.41	36.94	36.86	11.40	11.71
Latvia	51.36	50.65	54.31	54.11	43.61	42.19	39.19	39.20	11.24	11.33
Poland	48.99	—	48.14	—	41.53	—	40.32	—	11.81	12.39
Russia	54.43	55.15	56.06	55.49	39.10	38.30	38.11	38.03	10.83	11.16
Czech	50.75	50.67	50.04	51.25	38.08	38.50	36.57	35.76	12.32	12.89
Slovakia	52.38	—	50.71	—	40.88	—	37.06	—	11.97	12.94
Slovenia	51.91	52.90	52.21	51.88	36.82	35.89	34.15	34.22	12.64	14.15
Latin America										
Chile	36.61	—	47.79	—	43.80	—	38.92	—	10.11	11.09
Mexico	37.89	40.56	43.67	43.20	41.25	46.93	42.20	42.35	10.36	10.54
Asia										
Japan	48.48	48.30	48.03	49.57	42.20	41.80	40.10	39.00	14.25	14.60
Israel	53.30	55.29	58.12	59.11	40.00	39.10	36.09	35.67	12.89	12.61
Taiwan	46.59	48.12	50.19	50.74	43.42	44.08	43.08	42.80	12.97	13.45
Philippines	47.03	47.37	48.34	48.59	40.80	41.10	40.65	40.50	11.39	10.76

Note. 1. Sources are [a] UNDP Human Development Reports, and Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan (2022), [b] ILO (2023), Official Statistics of Japan (2005), Philippine Statistics Authority (2005), Russia Federal State Statistics Service (2003, 2015), Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan (2002, 2005, 2013, 2016), and [c] the numbers are calculated by the author from ISSP 2005, and 2015 (see Measurement for details). 2. Six countries did not participate in ISSP 2005 and 2015 surveys. They are not included in 2005/2015 analyses, and therefore, this table does not contain their information of country-level variables in 2005 and 2015.

Appendix 3. The Ranking of Country's Work-family conflict

	Time Squeeze				Energy Depletion				Blurred boundary			
	W → F		F → W		W → F		F → W		W → F		F → W	
	2002	2012	2002	2012	2002	2012	2002	2012	2005	2015	2005	2015
Liberal												
US	18	14	10	10	9	5	12	12	14	7	7	5
UK	21	19	14	13	10	14	21	18	2	1	5	3
Australia	20	22	12	11	18	9	19	17	1	2	3	8
Conservative												
Belgium	8	15	22	16	19	16	17	13	7	4	9	11
France	14	17	17	15	12	8	14	15	9	3	12	15
Netherlands	26	16	18	26	13	25	15	25	—	—	—	—
Austria	27	21	26	17	27	22	23	20	—	—	—	—
Switzerland	28	26	28	28	28	24	28	27	5	13	2	4
Germany	15	11	24	22	23	20	24	21	8	9	13	13
Social Democratic												
Denmark	22	24	25	21	20	19	27	24	11	6	6	7
Finland	25	25	21	24	24	26	25	28	10	10	11	10
Norway	24	28	20	18	17	18	26	26	12	14	17	14
Sweden	17	20	19	19	15	11	22	23	3	5	4	6
Southern Europe												
Spain	16	7	7	8	6	2	7	7	18	8	10	12
Portugal	11	18	5	9	16	23	9	9	—	—	—	—
Central/East Europe												
Hungary	6	8	13	23	8	10	10	11	13	21	22	22
Latvia	10	6	11	12	7	12	11	10	15	20	16	18
Poland	1	2	9	5	4	3	3	5	—	—	—	—
Russia	4	1	6	6	5	1	8	8	21	19	21	19
Czech	13	23	16	14	21	27	13	14	16	18	18	16
Slovakia	3	4	8	7	1	6	6	6	—	—	—	—
Slovenia	9	13	15	25	11	15	16	19	4	12	20	21
Latin America												
Chile	2	3	1	2	2	4	1	1	—	—	—	—
Mexico	7	10	2	3	14	17	2	3	17	17	8	9
Asia												
Japan	19	9	27	20	26	13	20	16	20	15	15	17
Israel	5	5	4	1	3	7	4	2	19	16	14	1
Taiwan	23	27	23	27	25	28	18	22	22	22	19	20
Philippines	12	12	3	4	22	21	5	4	6	11	1	2

Note. A lower number refers to a higher ranking.

Appendix 4. The number of countries that experience an increase in work-family conflict by social welfare regime

Social welfare regime	W → F			F → W		
	Time squeeze	Energy depletion	Blurred boundary	Time squeeze	Energy depletion	Blurred boundary
Liberal	2/3	2/3	2/3	3/3	3/3	2/3
Conservative	5/6	5/6	1/4	5/6	5/6	1/4
Social democratic	1/4	1/4	0/4	4/4	4/4	4/4
Southern Europe	1/2	1/2	1/1	1/2	2/2	1/1
Central/East Europe	2/7	1/7	0/5	5/7	5/7	5/5
Latin America	0/2	0/2	0/1	0/2	0/2	0/1
Asia	3/4	1/4	2/4	2/4	2/4	3/4
Total	14/28	11/28	6/22	20/28	21/28	16/22

Note. The numerator indicates the number of countries that experience an increase in work-family conflict in each social welfare regime. The denominator indicates the total number of countries in each social welfare regime.

Appendix 5. Social demographic characteristics for the analytical sample and the deleted sample

	Analytical sample (employed，age 18-55)				Deleted sample (not working，age 18-55)			
Individual-level (weighted)	2002	2012	2005	2015	2002	2012	2005	2015
Gender (%)								
Men	52.37	51.59	52.64	51.27	34.81	39.40	36.10	41.58
Women	47.63	48.41	47.36	48.73	65.19	60.60	63.90	58.42
Parenthood (%)								
No	44.65	47.70	45.91	47.64	46.92	50.21	45.36	47.66
Yes	53.34	51.08	51.62	49.33	50.79	48.33	51.16	48.52
Missing	2.01	1.22	2.47	3.02	2.29	1.46	3.48	3.81
Education (%)								
Non-college	80.53	64.99	78.66	60.35	88.88	78.29	88.58	76.43
College	18.91	34.53	20.63	39.46	9.49	20.61	10.26	22.83
Missing	0.55	0.48	0.71	0.19	1.63	1.10	1.16	0.74
Partnership (%)								
No	27.46	27.82	28.55	28.27	44.71	45.44	44.01	45.83
Yes	72.43	72.09	71.34	71.62	55.01	54.41	55.65	54.04
Missing	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.28	0.15	0.34	0.13
Family income quintile (%)								
1st	10.74	8.65	8.70	8.58	25.11	20.95	23.90	24.62
2nd	13.60	13.48	14.77	13.16	16.23	15.51	16.22	14.55
3rd	18.39	15.98	19.35	17.66	13.63	11.61	14.62	11.99
4th	22.53	21.24	20.20	20.59	12.32	10.99	10.34	8.72
5th	19.71	17.95	20.14	20.01	9.20	7.68	8.35	8.41
Missing	15.05	22.69	16.83	20.01	23.52	33.25	26.57	31.71
Age group (%)								
18-25	12.50	11.54	12.34	12.12	34.51	34.96	33.59	34.83
26-35	28.66	27.47	27.28	27.01	22.35	22.82	22.65	22.64
36-45	32.45	31.52	31.25	30.47	19.94	20.01	20.13	20.58
46-55	26.38	29.46	29.12	30.41	23.19	22.22	23.63	21.95
Other Adults (%)								
No	57.56	60.72	61.09	59.26	43.96	44.35	47.46	44.90
Yes	35.67	37.42	36.37	37.07	48.34	53.67	48.87	50.84
Missing	6.78	1.86	2.53	3.67	7.70	1.99	3.67	4.27
N	17,861	16,893	14,099	13,446	8,276	7,649	5,935	5,193