Beyond the continuum: A micro-level analysis of the gender equality-fertility nexus in three Nordic countries

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Introduction

The Nordic fertility regime has come under scrutiny at the start of the twenty-first century (Andersson, 2004; Andersson et al., 2009). The Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland) have been known for decades for having relatively high and stable cohort fertility rates. This has been largely attributed to the institutional and socio-cultural country context that supported gender equality in the labor market and the family (Ellingsæter & Leira, 2006; Ronsen & Skrede, 2010). However, since 2010 the total fertility rates of the Nordic countries have been steadily dropping (Ronsen & Skrede, 2010). It is unlikely that postponed births will be recuperated because fertility in the age groups 30-34 as well as 35-39 definitely fell considerably more than the amount to which fertility in the age groups of 40+ grew. As a result, the TFR for the Nordic countries in 2020 converged to the low EU average (i.e., 1.5 children per woman). All Nordic countries experienced a further decline in 2022, with Norway (1.41) and Finland (1.32) setting new lows (statistical offices of the Nordic countries).

Increasing postponement of first births, life-time-childlessness, and - to a lesser extent - slower parity progression in the most gender equal countries of the world seemingly contradict the central tenet of macro-level theories that predict high fertility in gender equal societies. There is

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growing scholarly interest in cultural explanations of the relationship between gender equality and fertility. Two theoretical frameworks address the gender equality-fertility nexus: the so-called "*fertility-equality reversal theories"* (Kolk, 2019) and the *second demographic transition paradigm*.

Fertility- equality reversal theories and the SDT paradigm make macro-level predictions about the relationships between gender equality and fertility across time and across societies. Both use a macro-micro-macro mechanism to give an explanation about how individuals adapt to a changing social, cultural and institutional context. According to *fertility-equality reversal theories* (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, 2015; McDonald, 2000) fertility behavior is a direct result of the opportunity structure to balance work and family and to achieve a satisfying division of labor for men and women. The basic assumption is a stable and relatively high preference for having children across all stages of the diffusion of gender equality within societies. *Second demographic transition* (SDT) theory (Lesthaeghe, 2010, 2020; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986) postulates that the spread of greater gender equality within countries may potentially result in a decrease in desires for having children. A shift in value toward a greater emphasis on self-fulfillment and individualism would make family formation one life goal that could potentially compete with many other life goals even in the most work-family-reconciling contexts, such as having a fulfilling partner relationship, aspiring for education and employment, and having plenty of leisure time.

Both macro-theoretical frameworks focus on the transformation of fertility trends driven by the societal diffusion of gender equality over time and space. We delve deeper in the complexities of how gender equality and fertility are linked at a given stage in the societal diffusion of gender equality. First, we focus on individual level behavior from which these trends aggregate and offer a systematic analysis of the micro-level mechanisms relating individual gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions. The Nordic countries under investigation (Denmark, Finland, Norway) have made significant progress toward achieving gender equality. They give us a very homogenous study context where it is anticipated that the juxtapositions of the micro-level mechanisms linking gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions are particularly salient. This is because people anticipate whether their attitudes are norm compliant or norm deviant which impacts whether their attitude is translated into behavior. Scandinavians with egalitarian attitudes -- regardless of

what they actually do, face a reasonable opportunity structure to actually practice gender egalitarian work and care arrangements. As a result, their desired and lived experiences are more likely to converge than they would have been in the same setting at a previous time or in a society with lower levels of gender equality at the same time.

We thus formulate the following first research question:

RQ1: How are individual gender equality attitudes associated with fertility intentions and how do these associations vary by (a) gender and (b) parenthood status?

We moreover consider the theoretical micro-level mechanisms invoked by fertility- equality reversal theories on the one hand, and the SDT paradigm, on the other. We therefore ask:

RQ2a: Does the extent to which individuals are achieving a satisfying division of labor explain why and how gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions are associated at the individual level?

RQ2b: Does the extent to which individuals perceive parenthood as a life goal explain why and how gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions are associated at the individual level?

We use recent survey data from the 2020-2022 data collection of the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS II) in Denmark, Finland and Norway (www.ggp-i.org). We select n= 15,547 women and men between 18 and 45 years of age, of whom 6,236 are childless and 8,683 have at least one biological child at time of interview One of the unique features of the data are rich measures on individuals' gender equality attitudes that tap into the public and private roles of both women and men and therefore address the multiple dimensions of gender equality that may change unevenly and at different pace.

Our study offers various theoretical and empirical insights into the Nordic countries' fertility decline as well as the relationship between gender equality and fertility more generally. First, this study helps us to explain the well documented demographic change in fertility rates of the Nordic countries by focusing on the role of attitudes on fertility. In order to shed light on probable future fertility trends at the population (macro) level, it studies the relationship between gender equality attitudes and fertility at the individual (micro) level (see Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015).

Second, we analytically acknowledge that progress in gender equality attitudes is neither uniform for whole populations nor linear towards greater equality across all life domains. We cover both the public and the family spheres, the attitudes on the roles of both women and men, as well as any ambivalence therein. Abandoning the measurement of gender equality attitudes along a continuum with two end points – gender non-egalitarian and gender egalitarian – we instead capture them in their multidimensionality. We gather *profiles* of gender equality attitudes that include combinations of roles assigned to women and men in the public and private spheres and link them to intentions to have a (an additional) child. By doing so, we move beyond the non-egalitarian-egalitarian continuum that most fertility research to date has relied upon and study individuals that neither fit the label "egalitarian" nor "non-egalitarian" (Billari, Philipov, & Testa, 2009; Miettinen, Gietel- Basten, & Rotkirch, 2011; Puur, Oláh, Tazi-Preve, & Dorbritz, 2008; Westoff & Higgins, 2009).

Third, we investigate how women's but also men's internalized social norms on the equality of women and men influence their plans to have (more) children. This is important for evaluating the predictions of the gender-equality-reversal theories, which address fertility decisions in terms of work-family-(in)compatibility for women, less so for men.

Finally, we address population heterogeneity and make an analytically distinction between childless individuals and parents. This is important for addressing the individual level predictions implied by the SDT framework about the emergence of conflicting life goals and shifting patterns of preferences for having children that might influence childless individuals more than parents – who already made the decision to have children.

Theoretical Background

Macro level theories addressing the gender equality-fertility nexus

In high-income countries, the degree of gender equality is regarded as a critical driver of fertility. Different areas of fertility research have been influenced by two strands of macro- level associations between gender equality and fertility.

Fertility- equality reversal theories contend that the degree to which the normative, institutional, and policy context assigns public and private roles to men, women, and both equally shapes opportunity structures of women and men to experience role compatibility or role conflict by having (many) children. According to Gender Equity theory (McDonald, 2000), these gendered opportunity costs of fertility occur when increases in access to and acceptance of women serving in public roles on par with men (i.e. pursuing higher education, participating in the labor force, and holding leadership positions) coincide with persisting gender inequality regarding how women and not men are perceived as being responsible for private roles (i.e. housework and childcare).

The link between opportunity structure and fertility described by the Gender Equity theory is essentially supported by the Gender Revolution theory, although it places more focus on how fertility rates react to the combined interactions of individuals (couples) with their environment. According to Goldscheider et al. (2015), achieving gender equality in a society follows two stages. Increasing gender equity in the public sphere during the first stage is driven by women's behaviors like entering higher education and the labor market at larger numbers, as well as entering male-dominated occupations more than men entering female-dominated occupations (Ridgeway, 2009, 2011; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). However, this change coincides with persistent gender-essentialist norms about femininity, masculinity, and parenthood preventing men's engagement in the private sphere. The second stage of the gender revolution would be completed when men and women will both be assigned and able to undertake private roles equally. Although it has been said that he Nordic countries have made the most progress in the gender revolution, they still do not achieve full gender equality (Lappegård, Neyer, & Vignoli, 2021).

The uneven rate of change in women's participation in the public sphere and men's engagement in the private sphere has been referred to as the Gender Revolution being "unfinished" (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011) or "stalled" (England, 2010). The gender regime that predominates in that stage of the gender revolution assigns women roles that are incompatible with one another while supporting men's lack of participation in family responsibilities. In such a situation, this would deter women - not necessarily men - from having (many) children as family commitments require women, not men, to work a second shift at home (Hochschild & Machung, 2012). These traditional gendered family roles must be loosened in order for fertility rates to increase.

According to the second demographic transition theory (SDT) gender equality diffused alongside a broader value shift that has made family formation a life goal that increasingly competes with other life goals that are incompatible with the loss of autonomy, opportunities of self-realization and individualism that childbearing implies even in the most work-family-reconciling societal settings. While fertility- equality reversal theories are based on the primary assumption that preferences for children are relatively stable over time and the realization of fertility desire is a function of the opportunity structure that women (and men) face in having the children they want, SDT asserts changing preferences for family formation.

In order to understand new demographic behavior in the area of partnerships and families, the second demographic transition paradigm emerged (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986). The Nordic countries are considered the forerunners from which these behaviors spread to other European countries in decades following the 1960s. These changes in demographic patterns showed as later marriage, lower fertility, and higher levels of unmarried cohabitation and childbearing outside of marriage. Changes in values and attitudes were considered the drivers of family and fertility change in postindustrial societies (Batool & Morgan, 2017; Lesthaeghe, 2010). In accordance with fertility-equality-reversal theories, SDT argues that progress towards gender equality - via women's greater access to higher education and the labor force - made them less dependent on men for financial support and social status, made other identities than that of the devoted wife and mother accessible to women, would lead to more egalitarian relationships and the reduction of gendered roles within the family. However, changes in people's inclination to uphold "traditional" family values, including the decision whether to have (many) children at all, served as the key argument linking value change to new fertility behavior. As ideational change that emphasizes individualism and self-actualization to diffuse, SDT predicts "less family" instead (van de Kaa, 2001).

SDT has been criticized for misrepresenting the degree of gender conflict that these processes involve. According to Bernhardt (2004), the effects on fertility may be more significant for women who prioritize higher-order needs, such as self-actualization and individuality, than for men who do the same. Moreover, changes in the gender roles, the dismantling of masculine gender ideology, and women's growing bargaining power and control over their bodies and lives are the

causes of postponement in union formation, marriage, and parenthood as well as rises in union dissolution and divorce.

Grasping the mechanisms of the gender equality-fertility nexus at the micro-level

Both fertility- equality reversal theories and the SDT paradigm link gender equality and fertility at the population level, but they rely on different, even contradicting assumptions about the relationship between attitudes toward gender equality and fertility at the individual level. Micro-level theories on fertility behavior, such as the theory of planned behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 2010) and its theoretical extensions, the traits-desires-intention-behavior (TDIB) model (Miller, 2011) suggest that attitudes toward gender equality have a direct impact on people's intentions and decisions to have children. According to our analysis of the two macro theories' dominant mechanisms, we argue that people's attitudes toward gender equality are associated with their perceived opportunity costs of childbearing through the (anticipated) household division of labor on the one hand, and the value they place on having children in general.

The gender equality-fertility nexus is still subject of theoretical debate and empirical uncertainty (Raybould & Sear, 2021). The relevant literature shows conflicting findings about the relationship between gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions. It has been demonstrated for a number of European countries, that attitudes favoring gender equality are positively correlated with women's intentions to have their first child, although this is not the case for men (Philipov, 2009). According to Philipov (2008) and Torr and Short (2004), gender equality attitudes do not correlate with higher-order parity. Westoff and Higgens (2009), using a different measure of gender ideology, showed a negative association between gender ideology and fertility intentions while Puur et al. (2008), studying just men, found a positive association. When Miettinen et al. (2011) examined the case of Finland, they discovered that fertility intentions were lower among both the most non-egalitarian and the most egalitarian men, and that there was more ambiguity in these correlations among women. Lappegård et al. (2021), studying a variety of European and Baltic countries, found that some of the different dimensions of attitudes towards gender equality (public sphere, maternal employment and father's role in the family) were associated with more variation in women's fertility intentions compared to men, being generally lower among women with more egalitarian attitudes towards gender equality.

These conflicting findings can be partially explained by the fact that it may not be possible to extrapolate findings from one study to other populations, contexts, and stages of the cultural and demographic transition processes. First, given that people may anticipate norm deviation vs. norm compliance by having a certain gender equality attitude, the degree to which their attitude is linked to behavior may depend on the extent to which they align more or less with the institutional and cultural context of the country they reside, as well as the specific level of diffusion of gender equality and a given fertility rate. Second, whether a person is female, rather than male or childless rather than a parent, the meaning of having particular gender equality attitudes may alter. Gender equality in Scandinavia is relatively high, gender egalitarian women and men have a reasonable opportunity structure to actually converge desired and lived reality. It is for this reason that we study these associations not only stratified by gender and parenthood status, but also in a homogeneous context of relatively high gender equality and advancements on demographic indicators of the second demographic transition.

The lack of a clear conceptualization and operationalization of gender equality attitudes is another factor in the inability of prior research to provide a comprehensive picture. One problem is that studies utilize several sets of questions addressing various aspects of gender equality. Another problem is the framing of gender roles as a one-dimensional continuum with "traditional" to "egalitarian" endpoints (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). This had impact on how gender equality attitudes were conceptualized and measured in surveys, which in turn caused the analyses to concentrate on the endpoints of the traditional-egalitarian scale. With regard to comparisons between gender and parity as well as the assessment of the type and degree of association between gender equality and fertility, this may create bias. Furthermore, without understanding what it means to be halfway between the non-egalitarian and egalitarian endpoints, the theoretical arguments about how fertility outcomes are related to gender equality attitudes are limited to movement on a single scale ranging from non-egalitarian (male-breadwinner, female caregiver) to egalitarian (dual-earner/dual caregiver) views. Thus, we expand upon a body of work that has emerged in the past ten years and uses a multidimensional conceptualization of gender attitudes (Begall, Grunow, & Buchler, 2023; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Grunow, Begall, & Buchler, 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Scarborough, Sin, & Risman, 2019). This viewpoint makes it clear that most

people's attitudes are not situated at the extremes of the scale and that they frequently hold more or less egalitarian views on many facets of gender equality. Our approach captures respondents' attitudes in profiles rather than averaging gender equality attitude components into scales. The relationship between aggregated gender attitude profiles and contextual condition in explaining TFR variation has been examined in macro-level analyses of fertility using this multidimensional conceptualization (Brinton & Lee, 2016), but micro-level applications have not yet been reported the literature.

Prior research on the multidimensional conceptualization of attitudes towards gender equality unequivocally demonstrates that the majority of people in modern post-industrialized countries exhibit some degree of ambivalence toward gender relations, despite the fact that a sizeable portion of the population (30-40%) holds egalitarian views on gender relations (a so-called unidimensional view). Combining traditional or gender-essentialist beliefs on gender equality in the family with egalitarian views on gender equality in public roles (women's' employment and access to power) is a common example of an ambiguous pattern. The tiny (5-10%) percentage of respondents who hold non-egalitarian or traditional views on all aspects of gender equality is another general result in this body of research. We formulate assumptions regarding the association between gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions for egalitarian, non-egalitarian and ambivalent profiles based on these prior studies, but note that the inductive character of the analytical techniques mean that we may find additional or different profiles.



Figure 1. Conceptual model of macro-micro mechanisms of the gender equality-fertility relationship derived from macro frameworks

Hypotheses

How are various gender equality attitudes at the intersection of public and private gender roles connected to positive and negative fertility intentions? Non-egalitarian attitudes toward gender equality include giving men more credit and authority in public roles while giving women more credit and authority in family responsibilities. Men who share these ideas concur that childrearing obviously belongs to the sphere of women, whereas women who subscribe to the idea of gender essentialism imply that parenting is a vital element of their identity. Due to the upholding of gendered, distinct spheres for men and women, non-egalitarianism may also imply a strong orientation toward parenthood as being viewed as an important life goal and a generally believed absence of work-life conflict. Therefore, both women and men who hold such beliefs may have relatively modest opportunity costs as a result of having children. Intentions to have a(nother) child are more likely to be positive for both women and men who hold non-egalitarian gender equality attitudes *(Hypothesis 1)*.

People who are egalitarian in their attitudes about gender equality are on the other extreme of the spectrum. Gender equality refers to the idea that both women and men are capable of performing in both public and family roles. According to the theory of gender-equality reversal, people who hold these views are more likely to encounter structural obstacles to achieving gender equality they envision for themselves. Therefore, having children may come with large opportunity costs for both women and men who hold these beliefs. According to the SDT's theoretical perspective, which places a strong focus on greater self-actualization and individualism, women and men holding egalitarian gender equality attitudes may be more inclined to view parenthood as one of many life goals that compete with one another or may even be mutually exclusive. SDT predicts that low fertility intentions have their roots in preferences for family formation being lowest in this group, in contrast to gender equality reversal theories that take fertility preferences as a given. As a result, we expect that both women and men who hold egalitarian views on gender equality are likely to have negative intentions to have a(nother) child *(Hypothesis 2)*.

Holding ambiguous views on gender equality in keeping with the idea of the 'stalled revolution' entails assigning equal importance of and capabilities for roles in the public sphere to men and women, while assigning more importance of and capabilities for family roles to women. The

implications of having ambivalent gender equality attitudes for fertility intentions are not immediately apparent. There are two possible opposite associations: On the one hand, ambiguous gender equality attitudes have their roots in "choice feminism", leading to the belief that women can have it all: fulfilling lives in both the public realm (i.e. the successful worker, the female leader) while taking on the main responsibility for their families (i.e. the devoted mother). No matter how realistic this is, holding these attitudes toward gender equality may be equally positively associated with fertility intentions as for individuals with non-egalitarian gender equality attitudes *(Hypothesis 3a)*. On the other side, ambiguous attitudes about gender equality may imply the belief or experience that women cannot have it all. The perception that taking on public roles will be incompatible with being a devoted mother points to a perceived or predicted conflict between women's roles in the family and the public sphere. In this way, people with ambivalent gender equality attitudes may be more likely to have negative fertility intentions *(Hypothesis 3b)*.

Accounting for theoretical mechanisms

We intend to capture the expectation, put forward by the SDT paradigm, that in countries at advanced stages of the SDT, a lower orientation towards parenthood as a life goal may emerge as other identities than being a parent become more accessible. We assume that people with egalitarian beliefs about gender equality are more likely to have a lower orientation towards parenthood as a life goal, which may link the adverse relationship between these attitudes and fertility intentions. For those with non-egalitarian attitudes about gender equality, the opposite may be true (see hypothesis 3a).

We account for the intervening effect of the satisfaction with the household division of labor in the gender equality attitude-fertility relationship. In order to capture the expectation advanced by *fertility-reversal theories* that it is through the combination of achieving a satisfying division of labor in private life and women's full participation in public roles that the recuperation of fertility in high-equality contexts is achieved. Instead of focusing on egalitarian divisions, we believe that complementary roles in non-egalitarian households may also explain their greater desire for children, while the potential double burden implied by the ambivalent attitudes toward gender equality may manifest through a lower satisfaction with the housework division. Lower fertility intentions could follow from this (see hypothesis 3b).

Considering heterogeneity by gender and parental status

Women's and men's intentions to have (more) children be impacted differently by gender equality. When women give family roles more priority and take on responsibility while maintaining gender-equal attitudes toward public roles, they may be more likely to experience the opportunity costs of having children. Women's work-care schedules are much more variable than men's, who typically maintain full-time employment throughout all life-stages (Bünning & Pollmann-Schult, 2015). As a result, women's attitudes towards gender equality in public and private roles may have greater impact on their fertility intentions compared to men.

Additionally, gender equality may have different effects on childless people and parents' intentions to have (more) children. According to the SDT, one reason could be that as gender equality becomes more prevalent, it is more likely that both women and men would acquire preferences for life goals and life styles that conflict with family formation. In the group of people who do not yet have children, the dampening effect of stronger gender egalitarianism on fertility intentions may therefore be particularly apparent. Therefore, we would predict that gender equality attitudes have bigger effects on the fertility intentions of childless women and men compared to those who are parents. The stratification based on parental status also reveals how beliefs about gender equality influence various drivers of fertility decline to the same or different extent. This is valuable knowledge given that childlessness is contributing more to the decline in fertility in the Nordic countries than parity progression.

Data and Methods

Sample

We use data from the 2020-2022 data collection of the second round of the Generations and Gender Survey Programme (GGPII) from Denmark, Finland, and Norway (www.ggp-i.org) to test our theoretical expectations. In our analytical sample we followed the restrictions imposed by our dependent variable of fertility intentions. These were recorded among women between 18 and 50 years of age and men with a female partner in that age group who were fertile and whose partner (if any) was fertile. After accounting for missing values on the dependent variable by

listwise deletion and the age restriction on the fertility intention measure, our analytical sample consists of 15,547 respondents.

Measurements

The question "Do you intend to have a/another child during the next three years?" serves as the basis for the dependent variable, fertility intentions. With a separate category for respondents currently expecting a child, responses were scored on a five-point scale. The original answer categories were recoded into a dichotomous measure *with probably yes*, *definitely yes* and *currently expecting a child* coded as 1 and *definitely not, probably not, unsure* coded as 0.

The main predictor are gender attitude profiles obtained through response patterns to four statements that inquire about the extent to which respondents consider public and private roles of women and men consider to be gendered. The following statements were considered[2]:

1. *On the whole, who would make better political leaders, men or women?*
2. *For whom is having a job more important, men or women?*
3. *For whom is looking after the home and children more important, men or women?*
4. *Who is better at caring for small children, men or women?*

The response categories were *men definitely, men slightly, both sexes equally, women slightly, women definitely*. The responses were recoded as dichotomous measures with 1 denoting an attitude that was egalitarian or gender-atypical. This indicates that respondents who allocated public roles (political leaders and jobs) to women and men equally or assigned stronger ability/ more importance for women, were categorized as 1 while respondents assigning the role to men were coded as 0. The coding was flipped for the two items referring to the family domain. The small amount of gender atypical responses (4% on the statement regarding political leadership,

[2] A fifth statement included in the data collection "*For whom is a university education more important, men or women?"* was not considered due to lack of variance (i.e. in the countries we studied, virtually everyone responded "both sexes equally").

<1% for the other three statements) impeded the analysis of gender atypical attitudes as a separate category and we decided to combine gender egalitarian and gender atypical responses.

We operationalized the *importance of parenthood as a life goal* using the statement "A woman/man needs children to be fulfilled" that was addressed to respondents in reference to their self-reported gender. Responses were rated on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being the strongest agreement. The question "How satisfied are you with the division of household tasks between you and your partner?" was used to grasp potential conflict in the reconciliation of public and private roles. On a scale from 0 (*not satisfied at all)* to 10 (*very satisfied)*, respondent stated how satisfied they were with the allocation of household work. In order to include respondents without a partner in the analyses addressing this mechanism, we assigned them the value referring to the sample average level of satisfaction (7.8) and included a dummy variable indicating partnership status in all analyses. To facilitate interpretation, both variables were rescaled to 0 to 1.

We included relevant socio-demographic control variables, such as gender, age at interview (in years), the number of children of the respondent, the presence of a coresidential partner (cohabiting or married), migration status (first generation migrant coded as 1, all others as 0), highest educational level measured by the ISCED 2011 (8 categories), employment status differentiating between not employed, part-time (<36 hour per week) and full-time (36+ hours per week) work and country of residence (Denmark, Finland, Norway). For sample means, see Table 1.

Analytical Approach

We identified attitude profiles based on the four statements regarding the roles of women and men in the public and private spheres using Latent Class Analysis (LCA). According to responses given to a set of categorical indicators, LCA classifies cases into profiles (i.e., "classes", Lazarsfeld, Henry, & Anderson, 1968). The model estimates the posterior probability of class membership for each class and each respondent. The substantive interpretation of classes is based on the average response probability to each item in a given class as well as class size.

The posterior probabilities of the selected three-class model were subsequently used in a series of regression models that predicted fertility intentions. Models for each gender equality attitude profile were estimated separately with the posterior probabilities of class membership (ranging from 0 to 1) as a predictor. The significance of differences in the effect of the three classes was assessed by estimating a model with the discrete class assignment as predictor. The models addressing the theoretical mechanisms correlating with both gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions -- parenthood as a life goal and satisfaction with the housework division -- were fitted as generalized structural equation models using the command gsem in Stata 15.1.

Results

Descriptive results

The first step of the analysis consisted of a latent class analysis to identify profiles of attitudes toward gender equality. We estimated models with up to five classes without additional covariates in Mplus 7.31 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Based on the lowest (adjusted) Bayesian information criterion (BIC) value, a three-class model was chosen as the preferred model (see Table A1 in the appendix for model fit statistics). The local independence assumption was examined using bivariate residuals, but no significant values were discovered. The discrete class assignment was used for the descriptive results showing the composition of classes (Table 1).

The preferred solution of the latent class analysis identified three profiles of attitudes towards gender equality, consisting of two profiles corresponding to the endpoints of the non-egalitarian-egalitarian continuum and one profile beyond this continuum. Figure 1 shows the conditional probabilities of egalitarian or gender-atypical response patterns for the statements that the four profiles are comprised of as well as four grey dots that show the sample average response pattern. The first profile which is also by far the largest (71% of the sample), labelled *egalitarian*, is characterized by a response pattern that assigns equal importance to/ability of women and men in both public roles and private roles. As the long-dashed line in Figure 1 shows, the probability of an egalitarian response is highest across all four items and also consistently higher than the sample average. The second profile (10% of the sample), labelled *non-egalitarian*, is characterized by a response pattern that assigns more importance/ability to men than women in the sphere of public

roles and more importance/ability to women than men in the sphere of family roles. As the solid line in Figure 1 shows, the probability of an egalitarian response to any of the items is lowest and consistently below the sample average. The third profile (19% of the sample), labelled *public-private ambivalent, is* characterized by a response pattern that assigns equal importance to men and women in the sphere of public roles while allocating family roles more to women than to men, as illustrated by the short-dashed line in Figure 1. This profile conforms to our theoretical expectations about how such an ambivalent gender equality attitude profile may look like.

Figure 1. Conditional probability of egalitarian or gender-atypical responses to gender attitude items per class



Table 1. Sample descriptives and classes composition

	Full Sample	Egalitarian (71%)	Non- Egalitarian (10%)	Public-Private Ambivalent (19%)
Intention to have a child within 3 years (probably) yes	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.20
Importance of parenthood as life goal (0-1)	0.19	0.16	0.30	0.23
Satisfaction with housework division (0-1)	0.78	0.79	0.77	0.78
Female	0.56	0.64	0.38	0.45
Age at interview (18-59)	33.97	34.02	34.17	34.63
Partnership status				
No partner	0.31	0.30	0.35	0.30
Cohabiting	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.30
Married	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.40
No child	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.48
Number of children (1-14)	2.13	2.10	2.33	2.18
Education (ISCED) (0-8)	4.89	5.04	4.66	4.81
Employment status:				
Not employed	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.22
Part-time	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.19
Full-time	0.61	0.58	0.57	0.59
Not born in country (ref native born)	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.11
Country				
NO	0.31	0.28	0.41	0.35
FI	0.35	0.39	0.22	0.30
DK	0.34	0.33	0.37	0.35
Observations	15,547	9,452	939	3,292

Source: Generations and Gender Surveys Round II (2020-2022) for Denmark, Finland and Norway

Note: [a] Responses "men and women equally" and gender-atypical response (Political leaders/Job: Women (definitely) more; Looking after home and children/Care for small children: Men (definitely) more) coded as 1.

We highlight the socio-demographic composition of the entire sample and its stratification by discrete membership to one of the gender attitude profiles with the greatest expected posterior probability before moving on to the multivariate analyses (Table 1). Around one quarter of the sample intends to have a(nother) child within the next three years. Differences between gender equality profiles appear small, with individuals with a non-egalitarian profile having somewhat higher fertility intentions, whereas those with a public-private ambivalent profile having slightly lower fertility intentions. It should be noted that these bivariate differences do not consider any

distinctions based on factors such as parity, gender or partnership status, and thus do not produce a valid assessment of the gender equality-fertility nexus.

The *importance of parenthood as a life goal* differs significantly between gender attitude profiles: Compared to the sample mean of 0.19 [0;1], respondents classified as egalitarian have lower scores (0.16) compared to respondents with a non-egalitarian and public-private ambivalent attitude profile (0.30 and 0.23 respectively). There is virtually no variation across attitude profiles with regard to the *satisfaction with the division of housework*.

Women are overrepresented in the egalitarian profile and underrepresented in the non-egalitarian and the public-private ambivalent profiles. The group of respondents who are non-egalitarian and those who are public- private- ambivalent are disproportionally made of partnered (especially married) respondents with children. Finally, among individuals with an egalitarian attitude profile, those with higher educated are overrepresented, whereas those with low education tend to be classified as non-egalitarian.

Multivariate results

The second step of our analyses comprises the empirical test of our theoretical expectations on the association between gender equality attitude profiles and fertility intentions. In a first set of models, we predicted positive fertility intentions (ref. negative) by the posterior probability of class membership (Table 2, Model 1). Models for each gender equality attitude profile were estimated separately with the posterior probabilities of class membership (ranging from 0 to 1) as a predictor. The significance of differences in the effect of the three classes was assessed by estimating a model with the discrete class assignment as predictor. It needs to be noted that because class membership probabilities and the measurements addressing the theoretical mechanisms linking gender equality and fertility intentions range from 0 to 1, the presented coefficients refer to maximum effects, hence the predicted fertility intention of a hypothetical respondent who is assigned to the corresponding class with a probability of 1. In order to assess whether our expectation of heterogenous effects across gender and parental status categories was confirmed, we assessed the improvement in model fit between models with and without interactions of gender equality attitude profiles by gender and parity (0 vs 1+) using likelihood

ratio tests. The results indicated that for all gender equality attitude classes, models accounting for fully heterogenous effects fit the data best. Table 2 presents the results stratified by parity (0 vs 1+), Figure 2 shows the results of childless respondents (parity 0) stratified by gender. The full models (including effects of the control variables) are presented in the appendix.

In our first hypothesis we predicted that having plans to have children is more likely to be related with a non-egalitarian gender attitude profile. For respondents without children, the findings support this hypothesis, but not for those who are parents. The likelihood of intending to have a first child increases with the posterior probability of having a non-egalitarian gender attitude profile. If a respondent is fully adherent to this profile (posterior probability = 1) compared to a respondent who is least adherent (posterior probability = 0) fertility intentions are expected to be roughly ten percentage points higher. Given that on average 22% of the sample reports fertility intentions, we consider that a sizable effect.

According to our second hypothesis, intentions to have a child would be less likely when someone supports egalitarian gender attitudes. Again, our findings support this hypothesis for respondents without children, but nor for parents. The size of the effect of class membership is a little smaller compared to that of the non-egalitarian class, with around seven percentage point separating respondents with the lowest and highest class posterior probability in terms of their likelihood to intend to have a first child.

Two competing hypotheses had been developed for the ambivalent profile. Respondents assigned to the public-private ambivalent profile are more likely to have positive fertility intentions, but only among childless respondents (although there is no difference between men and women in this case). The size of the effect of class membership is small with four percentage point separating respondents with the lowest and highest class posterior probability in terms of their likelihood to intend to have a first child. They appear to be more similar in their fertility plans to non-egalitarian respondents compared to egalitarian respondents.

In conclusion, gender equality attitude profiles are substantially connected with fertility intentions in ways that are consistent with our theoretical predictions. For respondents without children, these associations are statistically supported. For parents, all associations are statistically

insignificant. Additionally, although not statistically significant, the effects of gender equality attitude classes on fertility intentions appear stronger for women than for men.



Figure 2. Coefficient estimates from OLS structural equation models predicting fertility intentions, importance of parenthood as life goal and satisfaction with division of housework by gender attitude class membership probability at parity 0, stratified by gender

Table 2. Coefficient estimates from OLS structural equation models predicting fertility intentions, parenthood as life goal and satisfaction with housework by gender attitude class membership probability stratified by parity

		Non-Egalitarian				Egalitarian				Public-private ambivalent			
		Parity 0		Parity 1+		Parity 0		Parity 1+		Parity 0		Parity 1+	
Model 1	***Dependent: Fertility intentions***												
	Class membership probability	0.100	***	0.001		-0.066	***	-0.008		0.036	*	0.010	
		(4.59)		(0.09)		(-4.66)		(-0.78)		(2.10)		(0.87)	
	Control variables	*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*	
Model 2	***Dependent: Fertility intentions***												
	Class membership probability	0.055	*	-0.005		-0.035	*	-0.004		0.018		0.008	
		(2.46)		(-0.31)		(-2.45)		(-0.36)		(1.05)		(0.66)	
	Importance of parenthood as life goal	0.333	***	0.037	*	0.332	***	0.036	*	0.341	***	0.036	*
		(13.80)		(2.32)		(13.74)		(2.23)		(14.29)		(2.24)	
	Satisfaction housework division	0.086	*	0.054	**	0.087	*	0.055	**	0.085	*	0.055	**
		(2.23)		(2.60)		(2.26)		(2.65)		(2.20)		(2.65)	
	Control variables	*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*	
	Dependent: Importance of parenthood as life goal												
	Class membership probability	0.163	***	0.115	***	-0.110	***	-0.082	***	0.066	***	0.055	***
		(13.03)		(8.85)		(-13.73)		(-10.14)		(6.51)		(5.60)	
	Control variables	*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*	
	Dependent: Satisfaction housework division												
	Class membership probability	-0.015	*	-0.051	***	0.014	**	0.037	***	-0.012	+	-0.025	***
		(-1.98)		(-5.08)		(2.86)		(5.90)		(-1.95)		(-3.33)	
	Control variables	*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*		*included*	
	Indirect effects:												
	Class membership -> parenthood life goals -> fertility intention	0.054	***	0.004	*	-0.037	***	-0.003	*	0.022	***	0.002	*
		(9.47)		(2.24)		(-9.71)		(-2.18)		(5.92)		(2.08)	
	Class membership -> satisfaction housework division -> fertility intention	-0.001		-0.003	*	0.001	+	0.002	*	-0.001		-0.001	*
		(-1.48)		(-2.32)		(1.78)		(2.42)		(-1.46)		(-2.07)	
	Total effect class membership on fertility intention (direct + indirect effects)	0.108	***	-0.003		-0.071	***	-0.005		0.040	*	0.009	
		(4.83)		(-0.21)		(-4.92)		(-0.45)		(2.23)		(0.71)	
	N	5,464		6,093		5,464		6,093		5,464		6,093	

Source: GGPS II . *Note: z* statistics in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Control variables included in all equations: gender, age, age^{2}, partnership status, education, employment status, migration background, presence and number of children, country of residence. See Table A2 for estimates.

After determining the general pattern of association between gender equality attitude profiles and fertility, we estimated a set of structural equation models (Table 2, Model 2) in which we predicted fertility intentions based on the probability of membership in each profile and also included *parenthood as a life goal* and *satisfaction with household work* as correlates of gender role attitudes and fertility intentions. The results speak to the theorized mechanisms between gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions.

Particularly among childless respondents, greater *importance of parenthood as a life goal* and – for women only - greater *satisfaction with the division of household labor* were positively correlated with fertility intentions. Are certain profiles of attitudes toward gender equality linked to greater importance of parenthood as a life goal and satisfaction with the division of household labor? Indeed, the analyses show that respondents with and without children are more likely to assign greater importance to parenthood as a life goal when they adhere more rigidly to the non-egalitarian gender equality attitude profile or the public-private ambivalent profile. Egalitarian women and men are less likely to consider parenthood an important life goal. For childless women, egalitarian gender equality attitudes were associated with greater satisfaction with the division of housework, while ambivalent gender equality attitudes were associated with lower satisfaction scores. Finally, we were curious whether the importance of parenthood as a life goal and satisfaction with the allocation of household labor may be the driving factors in the association between gender role attitude profile and fertility intentions. First, according to our findings, respondents with a non-egalitarian gender attitude profile had higher fertility intentions and agreed that parenthood is very important to them. Second, respondents with a public-private ambivalent attitude profile had lower fertility intentions that correlated with their poorer satisfaction with the division of housework. This could imply that the perception of a double burden may be particularly salient within this group. The lower importance of parenthood as a life goal of individuals with an egalitarian attitude profile correlated with their lower fertility intentions, while their higher satisfaction with the division of housework had a negligible positive association with fertility intentions.

The structural equation models produced overall results that were consistent with our theoretical predictions concerning the drivers of systematically different intentions for having children among individuals holding various attitudes toward gender equality. The stark decline in the gender equality attitude profile's explanatory power following the addition of the

mediators to the models predicting fertility intentions shows that we were able to identify the mechanisms that we have theorized.

Robustness checks and additional analyses (note to reviewer of this submission: not yet written up properly)

We estimated models using discrete class assignment instead of posterior probabilities.

We estimated logistic regression models instead of linear probability models.

In addition to short-term fertility intentions, we performed our analysis on a variable capturing general fertility intentions (without specifying a time period of realization), where we differentiated between respondents who definitively intended to have (more) children (coded 1) and all other answers (coded 0). Results did not diverge substantively from the short-term intentions.

We excluded gender atypical answers on gender equality attitude items (ran LCA model without these respondents). Class pattern and distribution did not change substantially.

In order to assess whether we need to account for country differences in the effect of the gender equality attitude classes, we compared nested models with a class by country interaction to models without (but controlling for country). We stratified models by gender and parity. Because out of 16 (4 classes * gender * parental status) models model fit improved for only two, we do not present country-specific effects.

The coefficients of the effect of the gender equality attitude classes on fertility intentions obtained from a logistic model, using discrete class assignment and long-term fertility intentions are presented in Figure A3 in the appendix.

Conclusion

In this study, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the micro-level association relating attitudes towards gender equality and intentions to have children in the context of three Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway). These countries recently experienced a large drop in fertility that raised new scholarly interest in cultural explanations of (low) fertility.

The fact that progress in gender equality is not moving forward equally in all of its dimensions, implying potentially ambivalence regarding public vs. private roles, has not yet been

analytically acknowledged because until recently, survey instruments grasped attitudes towards gender equality as unidimensional scales ranging from non-egalitarian to egalitarian. Because of this, previous research could not identify important distinctions between individuals whose gender equality attitudes are situated beyond the egalitarian-non-egalitarian continuum. Using recent data and new instruments on attitudes towards gender equality, we identified individual profiles of gender equality attitudes and considered their non-linear and multidimensional nature. We then assessed their relationship with fertility intentions.

The study of the gender equality-fertility nexus is dominated by two explanatory perspectives. Gender equality may foster fertility by encouraging couples to share paid and unpaid labor equally, according to fertility-equality reversal theories. According to proponents of the second demographic transition theory argue that value change may reduce fertility by encouraging life goals that are incompatible with parenthood. We argue that both opposing mechanisms may be active simultaneously, which may account for the ambiguity that characterizes prior empirical evidence about the gender equality -fertility association at the micro-level. Our study addressed two theoretical mechanisms that may intervene between gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions, namely the importance of parenthood as a life goal as a measure of how central or not parenthood is in the lives of the respondent and satisfaction with the division of housework as an indicator of the respondent perceiving inequalities in the division of unpaid labor in their relationship.

We employed latent class analysis and identified three profiles of attitudes towards gender equality. The profiles which emerged from our data were in large parts in line with previous studies employing a multidimensional conceptualization of gender equality attitudes (Begall et al., 2023; Grunow et al., 2018). The most prevalent profile was characterized by response patterns that adhered to gender equality in both public and private roles well above the average response patterns in our sample. We labeled this group egalitarians. The least prevalent profile was characterized by response patterns that adhered to clearly gendered role assignment to women and men and was labeled non-egalitarians. In other studies, individuals with these attitudes are labeled as traditionalists but we refrain from the term that, in our view, historicizes the male breadwinner/female housewife arrangement (Janssens, 1997).

We also found one profile that lie beyond the egalitarian-non-egalitarian continuum, in contrast to these two that mostly fall inside the bounds of the unidimensional scale of gender equality attitudes. The fact that one in five individuals in our sample have ambivalent attitudes toward gender equality—that is, egalitarian views on public roles mixed with gendered beliefs in the family—is a remarkable descriptive result in and of itself.

We believe that the new items on gender attitudes fielded in the GGP II produce significant gains in terms of conceptual clarity when compared to the instruments frequently used and stemming from the 1970s and 1980s. These primarily reflect the prevailing view of that time, which held that men's rights and roles were the fixed standard and that differences in gender beliefs would only be reflected in thinking about women's rights and responsibilities. As a result, they have little to do with current discourses on gender and parenthood (Baber & Tucker, 2006).

The posterior probabilities of the latent class models were subsequently used to predict fertility intentions in a series of regression models. Among men and women without children, attitudes towards gender equality were clearly and substantially connected with fertility intentions. Stronger adherence to an egalitarian attitude profile was negatively associated with fertility intentions. A 7% reduced likelihood of reporting positive fertility intentions among those who most strongly adhered to egalitarian attitudes may appear as a small effect but it applies to the vast majority (71%) of the population of Scandinavian women and men that we study. Assuming that people realize their fertility intentions accordingly, low fertility aspirations among women and men with the most egalitarian attitudes may be an explanation why gender equal societies face challenges related to low fertility that are not rooted in the nature of the opportunity structure of parenthood.

Intentions to have a first child were positively associated with stronger adherence to the non-egalitarian attitude profile. Although those who perfectly fit this profile had a 10% higher likelihood of reporting positive fertility intentions, the overall low prevalence (10%) of non-egalitarianism in the country context we study suggests that this group of people – if they realize their fertility intentions -- may not be able to sufficiently contribute to fertility rates to stop the fertility decline in Scandinavia.

Respondents with a public-private-ambivalent gender equality attitude profile were more likely to report having intentions for a first child. This group, which disproportionally consists of men, is characterized by simultaneously supporting gender equality in the significance of public and private roles while sticking to gendered views on women's and men's capabilities to fulfill these roles. Decisions about starting a family thus do not imply ambivalent role expectations for themselves, but for the possible mother of the child they plan to have. This may help us to explain, why in terms of fertility intentions, members of this group behave similar non-egalitarianists. The ambivalent attitude profile also contains disproportionally more parents for whom we could not find support for an association between attitudes towards gender equality and fertility. It is possible that parenthood itself is the source of ambivalence in attitudes towards gender equality. This could be clarified by studying the associations between attitudes and fertility from a life course approach using panel data. Unfortunately, to date, no panel data exists that combines the multidimensional measurements of gender equality attitudes and fertility outcomes.

In a final set of analyses, we also looked at potential micro-level mechanisms connecting gender equality and fertility. To do this, we used structural equation modelling to estimate a number of potential correlations between attitudes and intentions to have children, as well as between gender attitudes and family orientation and satisfaction. The results indicate that the lower vs higher orientation towards parenthood as a life goal in these profiles, which in turn was highly connected to fertility intentions, is what mostly drives the association between gender attitude profiles and fertility intentions. These results are consistent with the theories of cultural change, like the SDT paradigm.

We also provided support for the micro-mechanisms proposed by gender-equality reversal theories, which emphasize the significance the idea of a perceived double burden in tying attitudes towards gender equality and fertility. Whereas members of the non-egalitarian and public-private ambivalent classes tended to be less content with their couples' division of household tasks, respondents with higher membership probabilities in the egalitarian profile indicated higher satisfaction with the division of unpaid labor. Parents showed greatest differences in this regard. This illustrates the double burden suggested by the public-private ambivalent class which supports women's public roles while also considering them to be primarily in charge for of childcare and housekeeping. It is noteworthy that although women

were more likely to experience the (positive and negative) impacts of gender equality on satisfaction with housework division, these associations were also evident for men.

Although our study provided significant insights into the micro-level association between gender equality and fertility, a number of limitations should be considered. The data's cross-sectional nature, which makes it difficult to separate selection from adaptation effects, is the most significant factor in our opinion. That is, whether attitudes toward gender equality influence intentions or whether attitude profiles reflect changes in intentions as a result of experiences (for instance, it has been demonstrated that being married or having a child strengthens gender essentialist ideas). The realization of fertility intentions may be addressed in a future study using longitudinal data. This would be highly instructive, especially with regard to the role conflicts that ambivalent gender role attitudes entail.

Furthermore, we limited our study to only three countries. While focusing on a relatively homogenous context for the macro-level institutional and cultural support for gender equality is useful for contrasting the micro-mechanisms we were interested in, including other Scandinavian countries like Sweden would help us gauge the robustness of our findings, but sadly this was hampered by data availability.

This study implemented a multidimensional perspective on gender role attitudes in the empirical analysis of predictors of fertility in a context in which higher gender equality coincides with unprecedented fertility decline. Latent class analysis is a powerful tool to address population heterogeneity in the extent to which individuals share certain attitudes about gender equality, while considering that different dimensions of gender equality that are ambivalent can coexist within individuals. We identified a largely overlooked attitude profile beyond the extreme points of a unidimensional egalitarian/non-egalitarian continuum to which one in four Scandinavian women and men belongs. The nature of this profile aligns with the notion of the stalled Gender Revolution in which institutions and men are lagging behind in supporting women's equality.

Our study of attitudes and fertility has ramifications for understanding the decline in fertility in the Nordic countries as well as in in low fertility contexts, more generally. First, those with egalitarian gender attitudes were less likely to have fertility aspirations. In each of the countries we looked at, this group was by far the largest. The assertion that gender equality is positively

shaping the opportunity structure for women and men to have children and to have careers may not necessarily imply a boost in fertility. Our analysis addressing the mechanisms linking attitudes and fertility reveals that while a sizable portion of the (childless) population in Scandinavia is indeed capable of realizing a satisfying division of household tasks with their partner, they do not necessarily prioritize parenthood as their main life objective. In that regard, even in case where parenthood is compatible with other aspects of life, gender equal societies may face challenges due to continuously delayed first births and subsequently low fertility rates.

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Appendix

Table A1. Modelfit LCA

#classes	Log likelihood	AIC	BIC	Adj BIC	Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin LRT (k-1 vs k classes)
2	*21600.24*	*43218.47*	*43286.86*	*43258.26*	*0.00*
3	***21522.78***	***43073.56***	***43179.94***	***43135.45***	***0.00***
4	*21513.95*	*43065.90*	*43210.28*	*43149.90*	*0.03*
5	*21513.95*	*43075.90*	*43258.27*	*43182.00*	*0.74*

Table A2. Coefficient estimates of control variables omitted Table 2 from OLS structural equation models predicting fertility intentions, parenthood as life goal and satisfaction stratified by parity

	Fertility intentions				Parenthood life goal				Satisfactions housework division			
	Parity 0		Parity 1+		Parity 0		Parity 1+		Parity 0		Parity 1+	
Female	0.084	***	-0.024	***	0.000		-0.057	***	-0.008	*	-0.051	***
	(7.36)		(-2.76)		(0.00)		(-8.27)		(-1.98)		(-9.54)	
Age	0.093	***	-0.086	***	-0.010		-0.007		0.035	***	-0.009	*
	(15.90)		(-12.80)		(-0.94)		(-1.19)		(5.18)		(-2.18)	
Age2	-0.001	***	0.001	***	-0.004	*	0.000	+	0.001		0.000	*
	(-17.20)		(11.57)		(-2.17)		(1.72)		(1.10)		(2.10)	
Partnership status												
Single	ref		ref		ref		ref		ref		ref	
Cohabiting	0.311	***	0.112	***	-0.003		0.003		-0.001		-0.030	**
	(25.68)		(7.52)		(-0.38)		(0.27)		(-0.28)		(-3.25)	
Married	0.303	***	0.091	***	-0.008		-0.004		0.044	***	-0.001	
	(15.78)		(6.68)		(-0.76)		(-0.33)		(7.07)		(-0.16)	
Education	0.021	***	0.022	***	-0.008	***	-0.011	***	0.001		-0.001	
	(5.88)		(8.88)		(-3.75)		(-5.81)		(0.98)		(-0.96)	
Employment status												
Full-time	ref		ref		ref		ref		ref		ref	
Not employed	-0.067	***	-0.006		-0.011		-0.015		-0.013	**	-0.003	
	(-4.79)		(-0.46)		(-1.40)		(-1.52)		(-2.61)		(-0.37)	
Part-time (<36h)	-0.062	***	-0.011		-0.007		0.009		-0.008		-0.007	
	(-4.31)		(-0.96)		(-0.84)		(0.97)		(-1.56)		(-1.06)	
Country												
Norway	ref		ref		ref		ref		ref		ref	
Denmark	0.009		0.022	*	0.087	***	0.122	***	0.042	***	0.057	***
	(0.69)		(2.31)		(11.41)		(16.53)		(9.00)		(10.05)	
Finland	-0.120	***	-0.031	**	0.004		0.040	***	0.044	***	0.049	***
	(-7.74)		(-2.63)		(0.44)		(4.11)		(8.12)		(6.49)	

	Fertility intentions				Parenthood life goal				Satisfactions housework division			
	Parity 0		Parity 1+		Parity 0		Parity 1+		Parity 0		Parity 1+	
Not born in country	-0.021		0.011		0.055	***	0.078	***	0.017	**	0.014	+
	(-1.16)		(0.80)		(5.24)		(7.44)		(2.58)		(1.76)	
Parity												
One	ref		ref		ref		ref		ref		ref	
Two			-0.314	***			0.005				0.005	
			(-31.09)				(0.65)				(0.73)	
Three+			-0.309	***			0.031	**			0.021	**
			(-26.15)				(3.27)				(2.83)	
Intercept	-1.420	***	2.215	***	0.050		0.312	**	0.777	***	0.972	***
	(-15.10)		(17.03)		(0.96)		(2.98)		(24.95)		(12.03)	
N	5,464		6,093		5,464		6,093		5,464		6,093	

z statistics in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$'

Figure A3: Coefficient estimates of effect of gender equality attitude-class membership on fertility comparing effects obtained from LPM to different model specifications



Note: LPM = Linear probability model predicting short-term fertility intentions (0 vs 1) by posterior probabilities of class membership; Logistic = Logistic regression predicting short-term fertility intentions (0 vs 1) by posterior probabilities of class membership; Discrete classes = LPM predicting short-term fertility intentions (0 vs 1) by most likely class membership (discrete class assignment); Long term fert int. = Linear probability model predicting long-term fertility intentions (0 vs 1) by posterior probabilities of class membership.