

# Assimilation by the third generation?

## Grand-daughters and sons of immigrants facing educational inequalities in France

### Introduction

In France, immigrants (first generation), their children (second generation) and their grandchildren (third generation) represent one third of the population. This "third generation" includes 4.7 million people under the age of 60, or 10% of the population in this age group (Lê, Simon and Coulmont, 2022). The identification of the grandchildren of immigrants in French statistical sources is rare and recent, in a context where the "republican model of integration" and the legal framework that stems from it have severely restricted the possibilities of knowing about differences linked to origin (Sabbagh and Peer, 2008). While in 2003 it was legitimate to describe the second generation as "*unknown*" (Simon, 2003), much progress has been made since then in the study of this population (e.g., Beauchemin, Simon, and Hamel, 2016). Today, due to a lack of adequate data, it is the third generation that constitutes a frontier of knowledge in France and beyond (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 2010, p. 1161).

The study of the grandchildren of immigrants is, however, essential. Indeed, theories of assimilation postulate that if the full convergence of the social properties and cultural practices of the descendants of immigrants with those of the majority population takes place, it will take more than two generations (Alba and Nee, 2003; Drouhot and Nee, 2019). On both sides of the Atlantic, the numerous studies on the children of immigrants highlight significant inequalities with the majority population, particularly in terms of educational trajectories and professional integration, to the detriment of ethno-racial minorities, with variations by gender. These results

raise questions about the evolution of these inequalities by the third generation. However, there are still very few studies, in France or abroad, that focus on the grandchildren of immigrants (Alba et al., 2002; Brown, 2007; Andersson and Hammarstedt, 2010; Ortiz and Telles, 2017).

Schooling is an essential dimension of social trajectories. The educational expansion of the second half of the XX<sup>e</sup> century, marked by two "school explosions" (Chauvel, 1998; Poullaouec and Lemêtre, 2009), has spread to all social groups (Cayouette-Remblière, 2016). At the same time, degrees remain a central resource in the positioning of individuals in the social space, despite a certain decline in their profitability on the labor market (Vallot, 2019; Vallet 2020). However, to our knowledge, there is only one French study on the schooling of the grandchildren of immigrants (Vallot, 2016), which focuses on their aspirations and not on their educational trajectories.

The objective of this article is to advance this emerging field of research by systematically analyzing the educational trajectories of the grandchildren of immigrants, from the end of high school to the end of higher education, by studying the orientation at the end of high school and the degrees attained. Our research questions, positioned at the frontiers of the sociology of education and the sociology of immigration, are the following: is the schooling of the grandchildren of immigrants still marked by the effects of their distant migratory origin or is it becoming indistinguishable from that of the population without migratory ancestry? In other words, do the inequalities identified in the second generation persist, fade or worsen in the third? Are there differences according to origin and gender?

To answer these questions, we conduct a quantitative analysis using data from the "Trajectories and Origins 2" (TeO2) survey conducted in 2019 and 2020 by INED<sup>1</sup> and INSEE<sup>2</sup> (Beauchemin, Ichou and Simon, 2022). This survey has the double advantage of being a unique source for identifying the grandchildren of immigrants of various origins and of offering precise and recent statistical data on schooling.

After a reminder of the theoretical framework and a review of the literature on the schooling of the children of immigrants, on the one hand, and on the place of the third generation in the theories of assimilation, on the other hand, we will detail our research contributions and hypotheses, as well as the data and methods used. We will then present our results, first putting the third generation into a socio-historical context, and then presenting our descriptive results as well as those derived from modelling. We will discuss the interpretation of the results, before concluding.

## Theoretical framework and literature review

### *Lessons learned from work on the schooling of children of immigrants*

#### *The diverse educational trajectories of children of immigrants*

On average, the children of immigrants do less well than the majority population, both in terms of academic performance, orientation toward the least valued tracks in the school system, and level of degree attainment (Vallet and Caille, 1996; Brinbaum and Kieffer, 2009; Ichou, 2013; Brinbaum, Moguérou, and Primon, 2016; Ichou, 2018).

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<sup>1</sup> French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) is the biggest European demographic research center.

<sup>2</sup> The French national institute for statistics and economic studies (INSEE) is a department in the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Employment.

Beyond this average trend, the educational trajectories of children of immigrants are very heterogeneous depending on their migratory origin. Indeed, while the children of European or Asian immigrants have similar or even more favorable educational trajectories than those of the majority population, the children of immigrants from Turkey or Africa encounter relatively significant difficulties (Brinbaum, Mogu  rou, and Primon, 2016; Ichou, 2018). The articulation of the effects of gender and migratory origin on these trajectories, less often studied (Feliciano and Rumbaut, 2005; Qin, 2006; Fleischmann and Kristen, 2014), nuances the analyses. The over-success of children of Asian immigrants is due to girls, and the difficulties of those from Africa to boys (Brinbaum, Mogu  rou and Primon, 2011; Brinbaum, Farges and Tenret, 2016; Brinbaum, 2019).

#### *How are the observed inequalities explained?*

The educational inequalities between the children of immigrants and the majority population stem primarily from social origin. The poor economic conditions and the lower level of education of parents explain a large part of the observed educational gaps. Until the 1980s and 1990s, it was thought that once social origin and family structure were controlled for, these inequalities disappeared, or even reversed - with equal characteristics, the children of immigrants sometimes fared better than the majority population (Vallet and Caille, 1996). More recent literature qualifies these results. Indeed, the social position of parents and their level of education do not account for all the differences between groups when studying diversity of origin (Ichou, 2018), and other factors such as pre-migratory resources, residential and school segregation or ethno-racial discrimination contribute to producing the observed educational inequalities.

## *The third generation: central theoretical role, discordant and patchy empirical results*

### *Importance of the grandchildren of immigrants in testing assimilation theories*

Assimilation theories are concerned with the approximation of the characteristics of immigrants and their descendants to those of the majority population and question its pace and heterogeneity. As some remind us, assimilation is a multigenerational process, and full assimilation, if it even occurs, takes more than two generations (Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 2003; Waters and Pineau, 2015; Tran, 2018). Yet, despite repeated calls to focus on the grandchildren of immigrants (Jiménez, Park, and Pedroza, 2018; Smith and Brown, 2019), empirical research has been primarily restricted to the first two generations (Drouhot and Nee, 2019) due to a lack of adequate data.

Historically, however, what happens between the second and third generations appears to be central and subject to contradictory results. In the United States, Alba and Nee (2003) observe that, for the descendants of many immigrant groups who arrived at the beginning of the 20th century, "it was only with the third and, in some cases, the fourth generations that the powerful undercurrent of assimilation came unmistakably to the surface" (p. 215)<sup>3</sup>. The same authors noted, at the beginning of the 2000s, that for the "new immigration" (which in the United States corresponds to post-1965 immigration), the second generation is still quite young and the third generation is very small demographically: "its distinctive characteristics *as a generation* will

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<sup>3</sup> Other work on these early migrations across the Atlantic observes a stagnation between the second and third generations, with assimilation in the fourth generation (Morgan, Watkins, and Ewbank 1994; Perlmann 2005).

emerge only in the future" (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 216), or again, in the words of Stepick and Dutton Stepick (2010, p. 1161): "This ultimate integration is for the moment unknowable.

In this article, we will attempt to answer this central question by focusing on the educational dimension, which plays a major role in determining the position of individuals in the social space, and in particular their insertion in the labor market and their income (Aparicio and Portes, 2014; Fierro et al., 2022). There is no work that specifically addresses this issue in France. To inform our research hypotheses, we offer a review of empirical research on the social and cultural integration of the grandchildren of immigrants in the United States and Europe.

#### *The integration of the grandchildren of immigrants in immigrant societies*

Overall, the literature on cultural assimilation lends credence to the (neo-)classical theory of assimilation (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003), which emphasizes the convergence of the characteristics of immigrants and their descendants towards those of the *mainstream*. Concerning the spoken language, they unanimously note the decline of the mother tongue in the second generation (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001), and the phenomenon of *anglicization* in the third, i.e. the sole use of English as the language spoken in the United States (Alba et al., 2002). In addition, a rapprochement is observed in terms of "values" between the third generation and the natives, a rapprochement that would facilitate homophily and bonding in high school friendship networks in several European countries (Campigotto et al., 2021). According to these authors, migratory ancestry no longer influences the likelihood of forming a friendship bond in adolescence from the third generation onward. A multigenerational rapprochement with the majority population is also observed in terms of gender-related

attitudes for Mexicans in the United States (Su et al., 2010)<sup>4</sup>. In France, the choice of first names for the grandchildren of immigrants also indicates a trend towards acculturation (Coulmont and Simon, 2019).

In terms of socioeconomic and spatial integration, the results are more mixed and vary by dimension, context and groups studied. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is convergence in educational and economic characteristics between the grandchildren of immigrants and the majority population in terms of social position and income, although integration does not follow the same pattern for all groups (Johnston et al., 2015; Forrest and Kusek, 2016; Lessard-Phillips and Li, 2017). Recent work on early twentieth-century European migration to the United States even goes beyond the expectations of conventional theories: descendants of immigrants surpass the majority population after three generations, i.e., "*accelerated upward mobility*" (Lowrey et al., 2021).

Most of the work that concludes that the third generation is socioeconomically assimilated focuses on European immigration in the first half of the twentieth century to the United States and Australia. However, research on other groups highlights the difficulties faced by some grandchildren of immigrants. Ethnicity and race remain salient in explaining the inequalities that affect certain groups in the third generation (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2019). Mexican-American third generations experience a "*third generation disadvantage*" (Ortiz and Telles, 2017): after controlling for social origin, the grandchildren of Mexican immigrants fare worse than the majority population, and even than the children of Mexican immigrants, in terms of

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<sup>4</sup> Indeed, this has also been observed over two generations in the European context (Röder and Mühlau, 2014; Pessin and Arpino, 2018).

both education and income. With lower wages and less valued occupations, this group would experience *downward mobility*.

In Europe, a few studies on the socio-economic characteristics of the third generation also run counter to classical assimilation theories. In Sweden, Ekberg (2010) and his colleagues observe a drop in income between the first generation of European immigrants, who have an advantage over the majority population, and the second, and then between the second and third generations, so that the income of the third generation falls below that of the natives. Similarly, in the Netherlands, large differences in income are observed to the detriment of the grandchildren of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants, but these differences are partly explained by their younger age and the more disadvantaged social position of their parents (Zorlu and van Gent, 2020).

Some researchers emphasize the importance of considering migratory origin and gender together, thus showing other forms of segmentation. In this respect, the work of Orrenius and Zavodny (2019) on the assimilation of Hispanics is remarkable: while the employment rate for women increases from the first to the third generation, it decreases for men from one generation to the next.

Several studies therefore suggest that migratory origin and/or ethnicity continue to have effects in the third generation. From a theoretical point of view, these effects can go through two main channels. On the one hand, migratory origin can influence at the individual level the sense of belonging to the ethnic community, either through a concrete maintenance of ties with this community or in a symbolic way, that is, in a form of identification with the culture of the ascendants or the country of origin (Gans, 1979; Jiménez, Park and Pedroza, 2018). On the other hand, migratory origin could act in a more structural and constraining way, in a context



of strong ethno-racial segregation (Brown, 2007) and systemic discrimination against racialized minorities (Telles and Ortiz, 2008).

As we have seen, the existing empirical results on assimilation over three generations are very mixed and depend on several elements. First, the dimension analyzed: convergence seems to be more evident in the cultural than in the socio-economic dimensions. Secondly, the socio-historical context: the geographical origin of immigrant groups, social and migration policies, the structure of the education system and the labor market, the degree of residential segregation, ethnic stereotypes and the intensity of racism, etc. are all determinants of the trajectories of the descendants of immigrants, which vary according to the periods and the societies of immigration.

### ***Results to be strengthened***

In addition to the scarcity of work on the third generation, particularly in France, existing work, especially in the United States, often suffers from a major methodological limitation: very few are based on direct identification of the grandchildren of immigrants (Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Smith and Brown, 2019)<sup>5</sup>. In the main sources of socioeconomic data on the U.S. population (such as the Current Population Survey, CPS), it is possible to directly identify immigrants and children of immigrants, but not grandchildren of immigrants. The latter are identified indirectly: individuals who are neither immigrants nor children of immigrants, but who identify themselves ethnically with a group of foreign origin, are grouped in an aggregate category *third plus generation*, without it being possible to determine whether they are grandchildren of

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<sup>5</sup> The *Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles* (IIMMLA) and the *Mexican American Study Project (MASP)* focus on localized populations (Los Angeles or San Antonio metropolitan areas) and/or belong to earlier waves of immigration.

immigrants or more distant descendants. The "*third plus*" category thus includes individuals with very diverse backgrounds and histories (Jiménez, 2010). Moreover, the self-identification of individuals with regard to ethnicity is not random in the population: the most educated would tend to declare an ethnicity other than that of the majority population (Duncan and Trejo, 2011; Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez, 2017). This self-selection would lead to a downward bias in the socioeconomic properties of the *third plus* group. The identification issue is therefore major and the introduction of questions on grandparents' birthplace in surveys essential (Tran, 2018).

The TeO2 survey allows direct identification of the "third generation" and comparisons with the children of immigrants and the majority population. It allows us to focus on the third generation without encountering the biases observed in the United States in studies based on ethnic self-identification. In addition, the data used are representative at the French level and are based on relatively large numbers, which makes it possible to take into account the diversity of the group of grandchildren of immigrants.

Concerning the educational trajectories of the descendants of immigrants in France, analysis has largely focused on educational inequalities in secondary education, thanks to the use of the Ministry of Education's panels of secondary school students (for example, Brinbaum and Kieffer, 2009). Some work exists on the early formation of inequalities between children of immigrants and the majority population, notably at the start of the first grade and in the sixth grade (Ichou, 2013). The degrees eventually attained have also been studied (Brinbaum, Moguéron and Primon, 2016). However, differentiations in higher education, which have been extensively studied according to social origin (Duru-Bellat and Kieffer, 2008; Orange, 2018; Herbaut, 2019; Rossignol-Brunet, 2022), have not yet been systematically analyzed according

to migratory origin. It is as if the difficulties encountered in higher education were simply a logical continuation of the previous trajectory. However, as Pierre Merle (2002) reminds us, education has been democratized in a "segregative" way and we are witnessing a translation of educational inequalities upwards and a displacement of these inequalities at the level of the orientations and streams of schooling in higher education. This article analyzes how this segregation takes place from the end of secondary school onwards, by comparing the trajectories of the descendants of immigrants and those of the majority population.

We have identified only one French study on the schooling of grandchildren of immigrants. Pauline Vallot (2016) looks at the orientation wishes of grandchildren of immigrants in higher education, using data from the "Jeunes" survey, a non-representative sample of children of respondents to the *Trajectoires et Origines* survey (2008). In particular, it shows that the grandchildren of immigrants are more cautious about pursuing higher education after the baccalauréat (*highschool diploma*) than the children of immigrants. This pioneering article paves the way for a more systematic study that shifts the focus from orientation wishes to actual trajectories and that relies on larger representative samples to allow for more advanced statistical processing.

Finally, the study of the second generation highlights the importance of the interaction between migration origin and gender (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Park and Myers 2010; Blau et al., 2011; Park, Nawyn, and Benetsky, 2015). But, as Tomas Jiménez and colleagues (2018) recently pointed out, it is very rarely considered in the study of the third generation (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2019). From an intersectional perspective, we will therefore jointly analyze the role of migratory origin, gender, and social origin.

## *Research hypotheses*

Four simple hypotheses will guide our analysis.

*Hypothesis 1 - Intergenerational convergence:* following the (neo-)classical theory of assimilation (Alba and Nee, 2003) and the empirical work that lends it credence, it is assumed that the educational trajectories of the grandchildren of immigrants converge, on average, with those of the majority population. In other words, the educational inequalities observed between children of immigrants and the majority population will be less pronounced in the grandchildren's generation.

*Hypothesis 2 - ethno-racial segmentation:* following the proponents of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou, 1993) and authors who put racialization processes at the heart of their analysis (Telles and Ortiz, 2008), as well as empirical work on the second generation in France that shows greater socioeconomic disadvantages for racialized minorities (Beauchemin, Hamel, and Simon, 2016), we hypothesize that these disadvantages will persist into the third generation for grandchildren of immigrants of non-European origin.

*Hypothesis 3 - gendered disadvantage:* gender is expected to play a significant role and interact with migration background (Feliciano & Rumbaut, 2005; Park, Nawyn, & Benetsky, 2015). If the trend identified in the second generation persists, racialized minority males are predicted to be particularly academically disadvantaged in the third generation (Brinbaum, Mogu  rou, & Primon, 2016).

*Hypothesis 4 - Segregative democratization:* the migratory origin has a determining influence on the courses of study followed by the children of immigrants. Those from Europe are more likely to follow short, vocational courses, where most of them succeed (Brinbaum and Kieffer,

2009; Palheta, 2015), while those from the Maghreb see their orientation towards vocational courses in high school as a "failure" and, after the baccalauréat, go on to university, where many of them fail (Frickey et al., 2002). We expect the same patterns in the third generation.

## **Data, variables and methods**

### ***Data: TeO2 survey***

The analyses mobilize the second edition of the *Trajectories and Origins* (TeO2) survey, conducted by INED and INSEE in 2019-2020 (Beauchemin, Ichou, and Simon, 2023). 27,200 people, aged 18 to 59, living in ordinary housing in metropolitan France responded to the survey. The objective of the system is to analyze the diversity of the populations and the effect of migratory origins on people's future; immigrants and their descendants are therefore oversampled. TeO2 also makes it possible to study the grandchildren of immigrants, thanks to their direct identification through information on the place of birth and the nationality of the four grandparents. An additional survey aimed at increasing the number of grandchildren of immigrants of non-European origin, mainly from North Africa (N=200), completes the empirical set-up.

The TeO2 survey questionnaire provides information on the respondents' life trajectories, covering a wide range of dimensions. An important module concerns the educational trajectory, from primary to higher education. TeO2 thus allows for a precise analysis of the educational trajectories of individuals according to their generational status and their migratory origin, over three generations.

### ***Scope and study groups***

The analysis is based on data from the main sample of the TeO2 survey supplemented by data from the additional sample. It focuses on individuals born in metropolitan France who are likely to have completed their schooling in France. We have thus selected three main study groups: the population with no migratory ancestry, children of immigrants and grandchildren of immigrants (see Figure A in the Appendix).

The "without migratory ancestry" population is made up of people born in metropolitan France, such as their parents and grandparents. It excludes people from overseas and their descendants, as well as "French citizens abroad" and their descendants (repatriated from Algeria, etc.) in order to select a population that is *a priori* protected from any ethno-racial discrimination and far from the migration experience. We will use the terms "majority" and "without migratory ancestry" interchangeably to designate this population. The children of immigrants (noted G2) were born in France and are either the offspring of two immigrant parents (noted G2.0) or of a single immigrant parent (noted G2.5). The grandchildren of immigrants (noted G3) have at least one immigrant grandparent. In the following, we will distinguish between those who have only one immigrant grandparent (noted G3 (1), which represents 56% of the third generation) and those who have two or more (noted G3 (2+)). Note that the grandchildren and children of immigrants studied belong to the same birth cohorts; they do not belong to the same families: the first are not the children of the second.

Children of immigrants (G2) and grandchildren of immigrants (G3) are distinguished according to the three main geographical regions of origin: North Africa, Southern Europe, and other European countries (excluding Southern Europe)<sup>6</sup>. We assign a single region of origin to the

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<sup>6</sup> Those from other countries of origin are included in the G2 and G3 population, but not in the analyses by origin, as the heterogeneity within this group is very high.

children and grandchildren of immigrants by arbitrarily privileging paternal ancestry, i.e. for two immigrant parents of different origins, the father's country of birth will be privileged to determine the immigrant child's origin. For the grandchildren of immigrants, the following rule of priority is in force: the country of birth of the paternal grandfather is privileged over that of the paternal grandmother, itself privileged over that of the maternal grandfather, in turn privileged over that of the maternal grandmother. These rules only apply if the country of birth is a foreign country (outside of metropolitan France and the French overseas departments).

Because of the different age structures of the two samples (see Figure B in the Appendix) and in order to have relatively homogeneous groups, we restrict the analysis to those under 40 years of age. In addition, we work only with individuals being of age of having the educational characteristic that we are measuring (level of diploma, type of "baccalauréat" obtained, or the type of higher education course followed). The numbers therefore vary slightly depending on the indicator studied. Table 1 presents the analysis sample.

TABLE 1. – Size and weighted proportions of individuals of the study sample

	<b>G2</b>			
	<b>Generational status</b>			
	<i>G2.0</i>		<i>G2.5</i>	
Number of people	684		605	
Weighted proportions (%)	53		47	
	<b>Origins</b>			
	<i>North Africa</i>	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<i>Europe (others)</i>	<i>Other countries</i>
Number of people	554	316	101	318
Weighted proportions (%)	43	25	8	25
Weighted proportions according to the whole population (%)	17			
Number of people (total)	1289			
	<b>G3</b>			
	<b>Generational status</b>			
	<i>G3 (1)</i>		<i>G3 (2+)</i>	
Number of people	547		428	
Weighted proportions (%)	56		44	
	<b>Origins</b>			
	<i>North Africa</i>	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<i>Europe (others)</i>	<i>Other countries</i>
Number of people	109	631	213	22
Weighted proportions (%)	11	65	22	2
Weighted proportions according to the whole population (%)	13			
Number of people (total)	975			
	<b>Population without migratory ancestry</b>			
Weighted proportions according to the whole population (%)	70			
Number of people (total)	5199			
	<b>Whole population</b>			
Weighted proportions according to the whole population (%)	100			
Number of people (total)	7463			

Field: Individuals under 40 years of age. Proportions are weighted.

Interpretation: The study population consists of 7,463 individuals, of whom 1,289 (17% of the population) are children of immigrants ("G2"). Among the children of immigrants, 684 (53%) were children of two immigrants ("G2.0") and 605 (47%) were children of immigrants from a mixed union ("G2.5"). 554 (43%) of the children of immigrants were from North Africa, 316 (25%) from Southern Europe, 101 (8%) from another European country and 318 (25%) from another country in the world.



## *Variables and categories of analysis*

Product of all previous selection steps, the highest degree obtained is our first indicator of interest: it synthesizes the entire educational trajectory. Second, and in line with the literature on social stratification in education (Shavit et al., 2007; Herbaut, 2019), we decompose access to higher education into a succession of two key transitions: the baccalauréat stream and then the transition to higher education for baccalauréat holders. Thus, we adopt a "horizontal" approach that makes it possible to account for the hierarchical differentiation of secondary school tracks induced by the expansion of access to higher education (Arum et al., 2007; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer, 2008). To do this, we use two indicators: the type of baccalauréat passed (vocational, technological or general) and the type of study followed after high school (Advanced Technician's certificate or health and social school, University, CPGE/Grande école<sup>7</sup> or other types of study<sup>8</sup>). These two indicators make it possible to study students' educational aspirations and strategies, distinguishing between studies according to their degree of professionalization and their prestige.

## *Method: binary and multinomial logistic regressions*

First, we highlight the internal heterogeneity of immigrant families by analyzing the historical and geographical context in which family migration took place. We will also compare the volumes of economic and educational capital of these families with those of native families, since social origins are a fundamental element in accounting for the conditions of family

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<sup>7</sup> In France, the Classes Préparatoires aux Grandes Ecoles (CPGE, i.e « Preparatory Classes for the Grandes Ecoles) is the most elitist course. It's a very selective course, which prepare intensively during two years to competitive exams in order to integrate an engineering or a commercial school. There's no equivalent in the US system.

<sup>8</sup> These "other types of programs" include all those that do not belong to the other three categories and require the baccalaureate. People going into these fields are very well represented in health and services (accounting, management, hairdressing, etc.).

socialization of children and for differences in schooling. Secondly, for each indicator of educational pathway, we will simultaneously present descriptive statistics and models showing the "net" differences between groups, after taking into account the differences in structure between the populations studied. We will systematically distinguish individuals according to generational status, number of immigrant ascendants and migratory origin. The models will be systematically stratified by gender. For the different groups, we will use logistic regressions to estimate the differences in the probabilities of having obtained no degree (or a degree lower than the brevet) and of having obtained a degree higher than a Bac+3, compared to the majority population (marginal effects). Symmetrically, multinomial modelling will make it possible to estimate the differences in probabilities (marginal effects) of passing a general, technological or professional baccalauréat and of enrolling in an Advanced Technician's certificate, Bachelor's degree or CPGE/Grande école compared to the population without migratory ancestry. Given the small number of grandchildren of immigrants, we present the 95% and 90% confidence intervals.

As "control variables", we have retained individual and family socio-economic variables whose influence on educational pathways has been widely documented. A first model takes into account demographic characteristics: migratory origin and age. A second model adds social background: the mother's level of education and a deviation of the father's from the mother's, and a combination of the parents' socio-professional categories. Finally, a third model includes other measures of socialization conditions in childhood: the subjective financial wealth of the household, the size of the siblings, the fact of having lived with both parents until the age of 18 or not, the fact of having been able to do one's homework in a room alone during childhood or not. The distribution of the groups according to these characteristics is presented in Table A in

the Appendix. There is a striking closeness between the characteristics of the grandchildren of immigrants and those of the majority population.

Due to the specific survey design, the descriptive statistics and regressions are weighted to ensure that our results are representative of the whole of France.

## Results

### *Children and grandchildren of immigrants: different socialization conditions and family resources*

The children and grandchildren of immigrants in the sample belong to the same birth cohorts and attended school at the same time. In doing so, their families (parents of the former, grandparents of the latter) have migrated in diverse socio-historical contexts, which influences their social properties. The children of immigrants are mostly from North Africa, while for the grandchildren of immigrants, Southern Europe is the majority region (Table 1). Within each region, the countries of origin represented differ according to migration status (Table 2). Children of immigrants from Southern Europe are mostly from Portugal (61%), while for grandchildren of immigrants from the same region, Italy is the most represented country (59%), Portugal being by far the minority (8%). For the grandchildren of immigrants in the "Europe (others)" group, Poland is the most represented country with almost a third of the total, while only 11% of the children of immigrants in this group come from there. These preliminary results remind us that we are not adopting an intra-family approach here and that we must keep in mind these country-of-origin effects when comparing immigration generations.

TABLE 2. - Distribution by country of origin of children and grandchildren of immigrants

		<b>G2</b>	<b>G3</b>
<b>North Africa</b>	Algeria	47	71
	Morocco	40	12
	Tunisia	13	17
<b>Southern Europe</b>	Portugal	61	8
	Spain	24	33
	Italy	15	59
<b>Europe (others)</b>	Germany	15	25
	Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg	28	28
	Poland	11	32
	Other European countries	45	14

Field: Individuals under age 40 in the population. Proportions are weighted.

Reading: Among the children of immigrants from North Africa, 47% are from Algeria, 40% from Morocco and 13% from Tunisia; 71% of grandchildren from the same region of origin are from Algeria, 12% from Morocco and 17% from Tunisia.

These differences in geographic origin must be put into perspective with the historical context in which family migration took place. The grandparents of the grandchildren of immigrants in our study mostly arrived in France during a period of large-scale immigration after World War II (particularly around the 1950s, see Table 2), in a context of strong industrial growth. This period was marked by the recruitment of low-skilled foreign labor. Italian workers, who have a long history of migration, were treated more favorably by the authorities issuing residence and work permits (Spire, 2005). Algerians worked in very low-skilled occupations, as did Poles, who worked in large numbers in the coalfields.

The parents of the children of immigrants studied tended to emigrate in the 1960s and 1970s (Table 2). Immigration from southern Europe, which was overwhelmingly Portuguese at the time, was mainly from the working classes in the north of the country (Echardour, 1996). In contrast, immigration from other European countries - mainly from the United Kingdom,

Germany and the Benelux countries - and from the same period was clearly more economically and culturally advantaged.

Table 3 presents the mother's level of education and the socio-professional category of the parental household according to the groups selected. We focus on the extreme situations, i.e., for education, the proportion of mothers with a level of education lower than or equal to the *brevet des collèges* (equivalent in US: Junior Highschool certificate) and those with a higher education diploma (Bac+2 or more), and for socio-professional category, the proportion of inactive, monoactive employee or worker households or households dominated by workers and those dominated by intermediaries or executives.

TABLE 3. - *Mother's education level and parent's socio-professional category by generational status and migratory origin*

	Level of education of the mother		Socio-professional category of parents	
	Below Junior Highschool certificate	Higher education	Inactive, monoactive employee or worker households or households dominated by workers	Intermediaries or executives households
<b>G2</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>19</b>
G2.0	72	7	65	8
G2.5	30	24	40	28
G2 - North Africa	57	13	58	14
G2 - Southern Europe	47	11	52	18
G2 - Europe (others)	22	46	22	47
<b>G3</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>35</b>
G3 (1)	21	31	37	28
G3 (2+)	18	33	33	42
G3 - North Africa	21	29	33	31
G3 - Southern Europe	18	34	34	37
G3 - Europe (others)	22	29	40	31
<b>Majority population</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>29</b>

*Field:* Individuals under age 40 in the population. Proportions are weighted.

*Interpretation:* 21% of the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa have a mother who has no diploma or a diploma lower than the Junior Highschool certificate, 29% have a mother with a diploma at least equal to a Bac+2, 33% belong to an inactive household, a single-earner household of employees or workers, or a predominantly working-class household, and 31% belong to a predominantly middle-class or executive household.

The analysis of the two indicators of the social position of the parental home leads to the same conclusion: while there are significant differences between the social origin of the children of immigrants and the group without migratory ancestry, these differences fade for the grandchildren. Family resources and socialization conditions improve between the second and third generations. Indeed, while only 13% of the children of immigrants from North Africa have a mother with a higher education diploma, and 14% belong to a household with an intermediate or executive background, these proportions are doubled for the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa (29% and 31%, respectively), and are at the same level as for the majority population. Similarly, 57% of the children of immigrants from North Africa have a mother with no diploma or with a diploma lower than the brevet, compared to only 21% of the grandchildren, a proportion 6 points higher than that of the majority population. The grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe even have a slight advantage: they are more likely than other groups of immigrant grandchildren and than native-born children to have a mother with a higher education diploma and to live in a household with a predominantly intermediate or executive status (significant at the 10% threshold). The trend is different for descendants from other European countries, with a higher proportion of inactive or working-class parents in the third generation than in the second, which can be explained by a strong country composition effect.

Finally, the number of immigrant ascendants is less decisive in the third generation than in the second. In the second generation, the social position of the parental home varies greatly depending on whether one has one (G2.5) or two (G2.0) immigrant parents, while in the third generation the differences are very small depending on whether one has one (G3(1)) or several (G3(2+)) immigrant grandparents. Thus, the grandchildren of immigrants and the population with no migratory ancestry grow up in similar social environments, or even more advantaged for those from southern European immigration.

**Differences in degree levels by gender and migratory origin**

The measurement of the highest level of diploma obtained makes it possible to objectify the situation of individuals on leaving school, and to take into account all the selections made along the way. Figures 1a. and 1b. show the distributions of degree levels for the different groups, for men and for women.

FIGURE 1a. - *Distribution of men’s highest degree attained, by migratory origin and generational status*





FIGURE 1b. - *Distribution of women's highest degree attained, by migratory origin and generational status*



Field: Individuals aged 23 to 40, i.e., of age to have a degree at least equal to a Master's degree.

Note: The two dotted black vertical lines represent the share of the majority population with a diploma below the Junior Highschool certificate level on the one hand, and with a diploma of baccalauréat level or more on the other.

Interpretation: Within the reference group ("Pop.maj." or the majority population), 8% of the women left the school system without a diploma (or with a diploma lower than the Junior Highschool certificate), 20% had a vocational trainee certificate (below HD) as their highest diploma, 21% the highschool diploma, 18% a diploma at the level Advanced Technician's certificate, 16% a diploma at the level of BAC+3 or BAC+4 (bachelor's degree or first year of master degree) and 18% a diploma at least equal to a BAC+5 (second year of master's degree, Grande école, PhD)

The distribution of degrees among the grandchildren of immigrants (men and women) is very similar to that of the majority population: their degree levels converge with those of the population without migratory ancestry, with even a slightly higher proportion of graduates with at least 5 years of higher education. For men, there is an upward shift in degree levels compared to the sons of immigrants: the proportion of graduates with at least 5 years of higher education



increases (20% for G3s, 27% for G3s (2+) compared to 15% for G2s), but above all, the proportion of non-graduates decreases sharply (from 15% for G2s to 7% for G3s), falling below that of the majority population. For women, the same trend is observed for the proportion of Bac+5 - although this time, G3 (1) are more represented than G3 (2+) at the top of the degree hierarchy.

The differences according to the origins of the grandchildren of immigrants are strong. For those of North African origin, the distribution of degree levels follows a "U" structure, for both men and women. First, they are more numerous than the grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe and than the majority population at the bottom of the distribution (the differences in the rate of non-graduates are especially marked among men: 16% for those from North Africa against 3% for those from Southern Europe and 9% for individuals without migratory ancestry). But at the top of the distribution, the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa are also more numerous: 23% of the men have at least 5 years of higher education compared to 16% for the majority population, and 35% of the granddaughters of immigrants from North Africa have 3 or 4 years of higher education compared to 16% for the majority population and 17% for the granddaughters of immigrants from Southern Europe. The grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe differ little from the majority population, although the daughters of this group leave school without a diploma more than the majority population (12% versus 8% for the majority population). Finally, among the grandchildren of immigrants from the rest of Europe, the distributions are very different according to gender: while men are overrepresented in the number of graduates without a diploma (17%), the proportion of women in this situation is close to zero. Moreover, women are twice as likely as the majority population to have at least 5 years of higher education.

Moreover, there is an upward shift in the distribution of diploma levels for grandchildren compared to children of immigrants from North Africa (especially for women), for grandsons compared to sons of immigrants from Southern Europe and for granddaughters compared to daughters from other European countries. In fact, granddaughters of immigrants from North Africa are twice as likely to have 3 or 4 years of higher education than daughters of immigrants from North Africa (with an equivalent rate of 5 years of higher education or more), while grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe are 2.7 times more likely than sons of immigrants from Southern Europe to have 5 years of higher education or more. The rate of Bac+5 and more, already high for the daughters of immigrants from other European countries, is even higher for granddaughters of the same origin belonging to the third generation (from 27% for the first, it rises to 35% for the second). On the other hand, more than twice as many granddaughters from Southern Europe have no diploma as daughters of the same origin (12% vs. 5%), and almost three times as many grandchildren of immigrants from other European countries have no diploma as sons of immigrants of the same origin (17% vs. 6%) and half as many have a five-year degree (12% vs. 25%).

We have seen above that the grandchildren of immigrants grew up in families with social properties relatively close to those of the majority population. We now seek to neutralize the few existing differences between the groups with respect to socio-demographic characteristics and to determine whether migratory origin plays a specific role in the positioning at the top or bottom of the diploma hierarchy. The following graphs present the results of two series of logistic regressions stratified by gender and estimated to model the chances of leaving the school system without a diploma (Graphs 2a. and 2b.), or with a diploma higher than Bac+3 (Graphs 3a. and 3b.).

FIGURE 2a. - *Risks of leaving school without a diploma for men, by migratory origin and generational status (average marginal effects)*





FIGURE 2b. - *Risks of leaving school without a diploma for women, by migratory origin and generational status (average marginal effects)*



*Field:* Individuals aged 23 to 40

*Note:* Model 1 includes: migratory origin and age. Model 2 adds: the mother's level of education and a deviation of the father's from the mother's, and the parents' socio-professional category. Model 3 adds: the subjective financial wealth of the household, the size of the siblings, whether or not they lived with both parents until the age of 18, and whether or not they were able to do their homework in a room alone during childhood. All measured effects are compared to the population without migratory ancestry.

*Reading:* The grandchildren of European immigrants, for example, are about 10% more likely than the majority population to graduate without a degree in model 1.

FIGURE 3a. - *Modeling the chances of leaving the school system with a diploma at or above the level of Bac+3 for men, according to migratory origin and generational status*





FIGURE 3b. - *Modeling the chances of leaving the school system with a diploma at or above the level of Bac+3 for women, according to migratory origin and generational status*



*Field:* Individuals aged 23 to 40.

*Note:* See note under Figure 2b.

*Reading:* The granddaughters of immigrants from North Africa have a 20% higher probability than the majority population of having a degree higher than three years of higher education, in all three models.

If controlling for social origin leads to a strong reduction in gaps for the children of immigrants, given their highly disadvantaged social origins, this is much less the case for the third generation, where children have grown up in families that are much closer socially to the families of the majority population.

The over-representation of the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa and Europe (except Southern Europe) among the non-graduates is not significant, as early as model 1. With a controlled social origin (models 2 and 3), the sons of immigrants from other European countries are significantly less likely to leave without a diploma. Thus, for this group and according to this indicator, we observe a decline in the relative educational position of third generation descendants compared to the second generation. On the other hand, the grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe, like the children of immigrants of the same origin, are significantly less likely to be without a diploma than the majority population.

For the granddaughters of immigrants, the observations made from the descriptive statistics are also corroborated by the modelling. With controlled social origins (models 2 and 3), those from North Africa, as well as the daughters of immigrants of the same origin, are more likely to graduate with a diploma at least equal to a Bac+3. For the descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe, the advantage of the second generation (i.e., their propensity to be less without a diploma and more with a diploma at the level of Bac+3 or more) is no longer visible for those of the third generation: after adjustment by the control variables, they have as much

chance of exiting without a diploma or with a diploma at the level of Bac+3 or more as the women of the majority population.

### ***Equality in the types of baccalauréat passed***

While the level of diploma allows us to summarize the trajectory of individuals, it does not allow for a detailed analysis of orientations. In this respect, the type of *baccalauréat* is strongly correlated with access to and success in higher education, with general courses offering a considerable advantage over vocational courses (Duru-Bellat and Kieffer, 2008).

Figures 4a. and 4b., which compare the types of *baccalauréat* passed for men and women, show that the variations observed are greater when the generations are disaggregated by origin. It is true that the grandchildren of immigrants are less often enrolled in technological *baccalauréats* than the men of the majority population, and more frequently in professional *baccalauréats*. It is true that, compared to second-generation women, but also to those of the majority population, the granddaughters of immigrants are over-represented in general *baccalauréats*.

But the differences according to region of migratory origin are much greater than those between generations of immigrants. The distribution by type of *baccalauréat* of second and third generation North African women is very similar, and moreover comparable to that of women in the majority population. As far as men are concerned, the grandchildren of immigrants from southern Europe continue to be over-represented in the vocational *baccalauréat* stream, as already observed in the second generation, while the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa are under-represented. The latter are also relatively less numerous in the general stream, but on the other hand much more likely to take a

technological *baccalauréat* (45%, whereas this figure is between 20% and 30% for the other groups). Thus, the grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe and North Africa are more often oriented towards less valued courses of study, as the vocational and technological *baccalauréats* prepare them more for short, professional courses than the general *baccalauréat*. Third-generation men from other European countries are overrepresented in general *baccalauréat* courses, compared to other grandchildren of immigrants and to the majority population.

FIGURE 4a. - *Type of highschool diploma received by men, by migratory origin and generational status*







FIGURE 4b. - *Type of highschool diploma completed by women, by migratory origin and*

*generational status*



*Field:* Individuals aged 18 to 40 who have passed the *baccalauréat* (whether or not they have obtained it).

*Note:* the two dotted black vertical lines represent the share of the majority population with a vocational *baccalauréat* on the one hand and a general *baccalauréat* on the other.

*Reading:* Among the granddaughters of immigrants from North Africa who passed the *baccalauréat*, 53% opted for a general *baccalauréat*, 24% for a technological *baccalauréat* and 23% for a professional (or vocational) *baccalauréat*.

We run two sets of multinomial regression models, stratified by gender, to determine the role of migratory origin, after adjustment by control variables, in obtaining a certain type of *baccalauréat* rather than another. Figures 5a. and 5b. present the results of these models.

FIGURE 5a. - *Chances of passing the general, technological or vocational baccalaureate for men, by migratory origin and generational status*





FIGURE 5b. - *Chances of passing the general, technological or vocational baccalaureate for women, by migratory origin and generational status*



*Field:* Individuals aged 18 to 40 who have passed the baccalaureate (whether or not they have obtained it).

*Note:* See note under Figure 2b.

*Reading:* The granddaughters of immigrants from Southern Europe are about 10% less likely than the majority population to obtain a vocational baccalaureate, for all three models.

Because of the moderate size of the groups and the categorical dependent variable, the statistical power of the analyses produces estimates that are too imprecise to show statistically significant differences (which is reflected in the large size of the confidence intervals). The descriptive differences highlighted above between the grandsons of immigrants and the men

of the majority population are not significant, as soon as we control for differences in age structure (model 1). Controlling for social origin further reduces the differences observed above (model 2). Thus, the grandchildren of immigrants have, all other things being equal, neither more nor less chance than the majority population of passing a general, technological or vocational baccalaureate. The lower propensity of granddaughters of immigrants from Southern Europe to take a vocational *baccalauréat* compared to women from the majority population remains significant, even when controlling for the social origin of the parents (model 2) and other socio-economic characteristics (model 3).

### ***The vocational higher education for the majority of the groups***

After high school, about 80% of the individuals studied above went on to further education, with no significant disparity between the groups studied. We are interested here in the first choice of orientation of individuals with the *baccalauréat* who have decided to pursue higher education, a legitimate choice according to the literature (Duru-Bellat and Kieffer, 2008), although it does not take into account possible subsequent reorientations (Rossignol-Brunet, 2022).

In France, the orientation after the baccalaureate can be done in different educational streams that we group into four main types: University (to prepare a bachelor's degree), Advanced Technician's certificate or health and social school, CPGE/Grande école or other types of courses, mostly short ones. Figures 6a. and 6b. show the distribution of first enrollments after the *baccalauréat* in these fields of study according to migratory origin and generational status, for men and women.

FIGURE 6a. - *Men's higher education enrollment, by migratory origin and generational status*





FIGURE 6b. - *Women's enrollment in higher education by migratory origin and generational status*



*Field:* Individuals aged 18 to 40 who have obtained the *baccalauréat* and pursued higher education.

*Note:* the two dotted black vertical lines represent the share of the majority population enrolled in an Advanced Technician's certificate or health and social school, on the one hand, and in a CPGE or grande école, on the other.

*Reading:* Among the grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe who continued their studies after high school, 55% went to prepare an Advanced Technician's certificate or health and social school, 33% to a bachelor's degree, 6% to a CPGE or a grande école and 5% to other fields.

For women, there are few differences in the type of higher education attended between the aggregate groups of descendants of immigrants (G2 and G3) and the majority population. The differences between the generations of immigrants are much more marked for men. Compared to the sons of immigrants and the men of the majority population, the grandsons of immigrants are overrepresented in short, professional courses (more than 70% of them prepare an Advanced Technician's certificate or health and social school or "other" courses), especially those with only one immigrant grandparent, for whom this proportion rises to more than 85%. However, they are less present in bachelor's programs.

Here again, the differences in enrollment are significant according to migratory origin, and even more so for the grandchildren of immigrants than for the children of immigrants. Three-quarters of the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa go on to prepare an Advanced Technician's certificate or health and social school, a much higher proportion than for the second generation and the other groups; conversely, 60% of the granddaughters of immigrants of the same origin go on to a bachelor's degree, a much higher proportion than for all the other groups, and very few go on to prepare an Advanced Technician's certificate. Finally, the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa are eight times less represented than the men of the majority population (2% vs. 16%) in the preparatory classes for the grandes écoles (CPGE) or post-bac engineering schools, the most elitist branches of the educational institution. They are also nearly ten times less numerous in preparatory classes than the sons of immigrants of the same migratory origin (19%).

The grandchildren of European immigrants are more likely than those from North Africa and the majority population, but also than the children of immigrants from European countries, for both sexes - although this trend is more pronounced for men.

FIGURE 7a. - *Chances of enrolling in a bachelor's degree, Advanced Technician's certificate or CPGE/Grande école for men, by migratory origin and generational status*





FIGURE 7b. - *Chances of enrolling in a bachelor's degree, Advanced Technician's certificate or CPGE/Grande école for women, by migratory origin and generational status*



*Field:* Individuals aged 18 to 40 who have passed the *baccalauréat* (whether or not they have obtained it).

*Reading:* The granddaughters of immigrants from Southern Europe are about 15% more likely than the majority population to enroll in an Advanced Technician's certificate in models 2 and 3.

The multivariate analysis confirms a specific effect of migratory origin on the types of enrollment in higher education (see Graphs 7a. and 7b.). The grandchildren of European immigrants are significantly more likely (at the 90% threshold) to enroll in an Advanced Technician's certificate than the majority population (the probability of enrolling in these fields is 10% higher for those from Southern Europe and 30% higher for those from other European



countries), with a gap that widens when controlling for social origin. Those from Europe (excluding Southern Europe) have a 20% lower probability of going for a bachelor's degree than the population without migratory ancestry and 10% lower for going for a CPGE/Grande école. The effects observed for the grandchildren of immigrants from Europe (excluding Southern Europe) are opposite to those identified for the sons of immigrants from the same region of origin. The tendency of the sons of immigrants from North Africa to enroll more in bachelor's degrees or CPGEs and less in Advanced Technician's certificate is no longer visible in the third generation, for whom there is no longer any significant difference in the type of enrollment in higher education relative to the majority population, once age is controlled for.

However, the overrepresentation of daughters of immigrants from North Africa in university programs (and their underrepresentation in short programs) is confirmed, even if less marked, in the third generation. For the granddaughters of immigrants from Southern Europe, significant effects appear that do not exist for second generation granddaughters: a lower propensity to go to a CPGE and an over-orientation towards the Advanced Technician's certificate. For granddaughters from other European countries, they are not significantly more likely to choose a particular course of study than the majority population (and this is true as early as model 1).

## **Discussion and conclusion**

In France and in all societies with a long history of immigration, the precise study of immigrant grandchildren, and in particular their schooling, is a major knowledge issue. Thanks to the direct identification of immigrant grandchildren made possible by the *Trajectories and Origins 2* survey, we have been able to compare the educational trajectories of immigrant grandchildren of different origins with those of the children of immigrants and the majority population in order to

determine whether there is intergenerational convergence or ethno-racial segmentation. Rather than focusing on the "ambitions" or "aspirations" of students, this article has helped to objectify some of the key elements of the educational trajectory of grandchildren of immigrants. It also offered both a "vertical" and "horizontal" approach to educational trajectories by comparing, in addition to degree levels, the orientations followed with the same degree, which highlights less visible inequalities. Finally, by combining the effects of gender and migratory origin, it has highlighted different gendered trajectories according to origin.

The first result is that, when the third generation is considered as a whole, the gaps with the majority population are small for almost all the indicators selected. Thus, a convergence of educational trajectories takes place over the generations, as predicted by classical theories of assimilation. However, taking into account the internal heterogeneity of the group of immigrant grandchildren according to origin and gender nuances this observation (see Table 4).

Indeed, the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa are more represented at the bottom of the distribution of degree levels, and less at the top, than the majority population. However, these results are not significant when controlling for age. The granddaughters of immigrants from North Africa are significantly more numerous at the top of the degree distribution, whether or not we adjust for social origin. Multi-generational comparisons suggest an adjustment between aspirations and actual performance of men between the second and third generations. Indeed, while the sons of immigrants from this region are significantly more likely to pass a general *baccalauréat*, to be directed towards a preparatory class or a bachelor's degree than the majority population, this is no longer the case for the grandchildren of immigrants from this region, who seem to show greater caution. The disillusionment of the second generations of previous cohorts, linked to significant failure in higher education, who

wanted to escape the working class condition (Brinbaum and Guégnard, 2012), is one possible explanation for this reserve. The granddaughters of immigrants from North Africa, on the other hand, continue to go to university massively, where they succeed brilliantly.

The diploma levels of the grandchildren of immigrants from Southern Europe are similar to those of the majority population, but their over-orientation towards short and vocational higher education courses sets them apart. Insofar as these streams are less legitimate in the eyes of the educational institution, there is a shift in inequalities towards secondary and higher education streams and a form of segregative democratization (Goux and Maurin, 1995; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer, 2000; Thélot and Vallet, 2000; Merle, 2002). As Brinbaum and Kieffer (2009, p. 561) point out, "the emergence of differentiated and hierarchical streams does not eliminate inequalities but rather transforms them. This over-representation of the descendants of South European immigrants in professional fields is a well-known result of the literature on the second generation (Brinbaum and Kieffer, 2009). Caution about the desires of grandchildren of southern European immigrants to pursue higher education had already been suggested (Vallot, 2016). Our results confirm the consistency of orientations from one generation to the next for descendants of immigrants from this region.

Analyses concerning the descendants of immigrants from other European countries are more difficult to interpret, in particular because of the very different socio-historical context of family migration between the second and third generations. Indeed, it seems consistent that the children of immigrants in this group, mainly from Western Europe and having grown up in privileged environments, are more inclined towards general courses of study and have higher levels of diplomas than the majority population. For the grandchildren of immigrants from

Europe (other countries), many of whom came from low-skilled migrant families, the results are ambiguous and vary greatly by gender: women fare better than the majority population, while many men do not have a degree or are in the short end of the spectrum. The analyses of the descendants of immigrants in this region are nevertheless interesting in that they highlight three limitations of our work.

TABLE 4. - *Summary of salient differences between grandchildren of immigrants and the majority population, by origin and gender*

	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
<b>North Africa</b>	(More without diploma) (More in technical <i>baccalauréat</i> ), less in professional <i>baccalauréat</i> (More in short courses)	Fewer without diploma, more with diploma >Bac+3 More in University, less in short courses
<b>Southern Europe</b>	Less than no degree More in short courses	(More without diploma) Less in vocational <i>baccalauréat</i> More in short courses, less in CPGE
<b>Europe (other)</b>	(More without diploma) More in short courses, less in Bachelor's and CPGE	(Less than no diploma) (More in general <i>baccalauréat</i> )

Note: Only statistically significant differences after controlling for social background are presented. Nevertheless, large descriptive differences that are no longer significant in the models are included in parentheses.

The multigenerational perspective adopted here, which consists of comparing generations of immigrants who attended school at the same time on the basis of aggregated groups, does not allow us to fully grasp the differences observed between children and grandchildren of immigrants. Indeed, our study concerns groups that differ in many aspects (migration history, volumes of economic and cultural capital, etc.). Only a *within-family* approach, which will be the subject of a future article, offers intergenerational comparisons.

Second, our results do not take into account all the complexity of educational trajectories (repetition, reorientation, double-degrees, etc.) which may be indicators of additional inequalities. We observe the passage of the *baccalauréat*, without knowing whether or not it will actually be obtained. In the same way, entering a preparatory class, an Advanced Technician's certificate or joining university does not necessarily mean success in these courses. The levels of diploma attained make it possible to objectify the "successes" or "failures" of individuals, but individuals are not systematically monitored throughout their career. Moreover, the specialization of degrees, which plays a major role in the forms of horizontal stratification, is not the subject of our article. In this respect, the trajectories of the granddaughters of immigrants from Europe (except Southern Europe), who are more often oriented towards short courses of study while holding higher levels of diploma, testify to these limitations and to the need to take into account the reorientations and "bridges" taken in higher education.


Third, our research is essentially descriptive. The only mechanism measured is social origin. Other factors, such as discrimination against certain communities or school segregation phenomena, are not dealt with, even though they are the preferred interpretative avenues for analyzing the "net" effect of migratory origin. Even though it decreases between the second and third generation, the fact of declaring to have suffered at least one unfair treatment in school is almost three times higher among the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa than among the majority population (this figure is 21% for the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa, 31% for the children of immigrants from this region and 12% for the majority population). Similarly, school segregation is still at work for third-generation racialized individuals: 39% of the grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa state that, in their

opinion, "more than half" of their class in high school was of immigrant origin (this figure is 64% for the children of immigrants of the same origin and 16% for the majority population).

This article therefore constitutes an initial analysis of the educational trajectories of the grandchildren of immigrants according to gender and migratory origin that deserves to be pursued. It contributes to the discussion of assimilation theories by highlighting the role of migratory origin and persistent inequalities for certain groups in the third generation. As Borjas noted in 1994, '*Ethnicity matters, and it matters for a very long time*'.

# Appendix


GRAPH A. - Tree structure of the groups studied



18

Field: All individuals in the study sample

FIGURE B. - Age distribution of the main and complementary sample of the TeO2 survey



Field: The entire population of the main and supplemental sample.

Reading: Here we represent the age distributions for the two samples as "whisker boxes." The lower and upper sides of the box are the first and third quartile. The box thus covers the interquartile range, where 50% of the data

fall. The horizontal line that separates the box into two represents the median (of 40 years in the main sample and 23 years in the supplemental sample).



TABLE A. - Distribution of explanatory variables by study group (%)

	G2	G2.0	G2.5	G2 – North Africa	G2 - Southern Europe	G2 - Europe (other)	G3	G3 (1)	G3 (2+)	G3 – North Africa	G3 - Southern Europe	G3 - Europe (other)	Pop. maj.
<b>Gender</b>													
<i>Woman (Ref.)</i>	49	49	48	50	49	48	51	52	51	64	51	47	52
Male	51	51	52	50	54	52	49	48	49	36	49	53	48
<b>Age</b>													
<i>17-23 years (Ref.)</i>	31	27	36	32	21	34	24	25	23	41	24	13	27
24-30 years old	27	29	26	25	25	27	37	33	42	32	42	25	26
31-40 years old	41	44	38	43	55	39	39	41	35	26	35	63	47
<b>Household's PCS</b>													
<i>Inactive or single-earner employee or worker households (Ref.)</i>	21	28	13	30	11	<u>7</u>	10	11	8	<u>13</u>	9	11	11
Predominantly working-class households	30	34	26	28	41	<u>15</u>	24	24	25	20	25	29	26
Households with a predominantly small independent	13	13	13	12	15	<u>12</u>	8	9	7	<u>11</u>	7	7	12
Employed (or intermediate) households	17	16	19	16	15	20	24	29	18	24	22	23	22
Households of intermediate (or executive) age	13	7	19	9	14	28	19	16	24	17	22	15	19
Managerial households	6	3	10	4	<u>4</u>	19	14	11	18	14	15	16	10
<b>Mother's diploma</b>													
No diploma	37	56	16	45	29	<u>10</u>	7	9	5	<u>13</u>	7	<u>6</u>	10
<i>CAP-BEP (Ref.)</i>	17	11	23	15	27	<u>15</u>	28	26	31	26	28	30	29
CEP	5	5	6	5	9	<u>3</u>	4	4	3	<u>4</u>	4	<u>3</u>	7
Brevet des collèges	8	8	8	7	9	<u>9</u>	9	7	11	<u>4</u>	7	13	7
Technological or professional baccalaureate	4	3	6	4	6	<u>5</u>	8	7	8	17	8	<u>6</u>	8

General Baccalaureate	11	9	14	12	10	<u>11</u>	12	15	9	<u>7</u>	13	12	13
BAC+2	7	4	10	5	6	<u>12</u>	13	12	15	17	15	9	11
BAC+3 or 4	7	3	10	5	<u>3</u>	20	10	9	12	<u>1</u>	11	<u>6</u>	11
BAC+5 and more	5	2	7	3	2	<u>14</u>	9	11	6	<u>2</u>	8	14	5
<b>Father's/Mother's diploma</b>													
Above	28	23	34	28	26	35	22	20	24	24	23	15	31
<i>Same (Ref.)</i>	45	59	29	48	39	34	37	45	28	30	33	51	37
Below	27	18	37	25	35	31	41	35	48	47	43	34	32
<b>Household financial strength</b>													
At ease	57	56	59	58	58	63	59	59	60	50	64	47	57
<i>Medium (Ref.)</i>	30	32	29	30	31	28	28	30	25	37	26	32	32
In trouble	12	12	12	12	11	<u>9</u>	12	10	15	<u>13</u>	10	21	11
<b>Size of siblings</b>													
Only child	6	4	9	4	8	<u>12</u>	9	4	14	<u>11</u>	8	10	9
A brother or sister	24	16	34	14	45	35	42	45	42	45	44	30	37
<i>Two brothers and sisters (Ref.)</i>	26	23	28	23	30	33	28	28	28	16	29	35	31
Three or more siblings	43	57	29	59	18	20	21	25	15	28	19	24	23
<b>Parents' Union</b>													
<i>No (Ref.)</i>	24	16	32	22	22	33	32	33	31	45	27	34	27
Yes	76	84	68	78	78	67	68	67	69	55	73	66	73
<b>Room alone to do homework</b>													
<i>No (Ref.)</i>	17	23	11	19	11	<u>9</u>	9	8	9	14	6	10	8
Yes	83	77	89	81	89	91	91	92	91	86	94	90	92
<b>N (numbers)</b>	1289	684	605	554	316	101	975	547	428	109	631	213	5199

Field: Individuals aged 18-40. Proportions are weighted.

Reading: Out of 100 grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa, 13 are aged 17 to 23, 25 are aged 24 to 30 and 63 are aged 31 to 40. The percentages in italics and underlined correspond to numbers less than 10 for the group and modality considered.

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